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The “continuity of interest” doctrine has determined the 
tax treatment of corporate mergers for over seventy years.  
Under this doctrine, a corporate merger may qualify for tax-
deferred treatment if an acquiror corporation pays 
shareholders of the target corporation consideration that 
consists of at least a minimum amount of the acquiror 
corporation’s stock.  The continuity of interest doctrine has 
been criticized as unclear, inefficient, and unfair.  Much of 
this criticism, however, is obsolete and largely unpersuasive.  
This Article offers a different justification for repealing the 
doctrine: The end that the continuity of interest doctrine is 
intended to achieve—an aggregate group of former target 
corporation shareholders maintaining a “continuity of 
interest” in the acquiror corporation following a merger—is 
fiction.  Because the doctrine serves a fictional premise, it 
does not distinguish effectively between special mergers 
deserving of tax-deferred treatment and ordinary sales that 
should be taxed currently.  The second half of this Article 
presents a new proposal for replacing the continuity of 
interest doctrine.  Without any regard to the nature of the 
consideration paid, the proposal delivers tax-deferred 
treatment where the acquiror corporation continues the 
historic business of the target corporation for at least two 
years following the merger and where a target shareholder’s 
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position within the enterprise does not change significantly as 
a result of its exchange of target corporation stock for stock in 
this acquiror corporation.  While the continuity of interest 
doctrine serves a fictitious premise, the proposal presented in 
this Article restores some sense of truth to the policy of 
reserving special tax treatment for mergers that represent 
mere changes in form. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
If Tevye from the Broadway classic Fiddler on the Roof1 
were a tax lawyer instead of a milkman, he might stare 
quizzically at the reorganization provisions of the Internal 
Revenue Code (the “Code”) and describe them as overflowing 
with peculiar traditions.  Here, he might say, we have 
traditions for everything—how to assume liabilities, how to 
pay consideration, and even how to merge!2  Because of these 
traditions, the tax law governing corporate mergers has kept 
its balance for many, many years.  One may ask, how did 
these traditions get started?  Understandably, Tevye might 
answer, “I’ll tell you—I don’t know.”3 
Of all these strange traditions, there is none as puzzling, 
or as important, as the celebrated “continuity of interest” 
 
* Associate, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz.  B.A., New York 
University, 1999; J.D., Harvard Law School, 2002.  I am grateful to Eran 
Lempert for his encouragement and helpful comments during the drafting 
of this Article.  I also thank Brookes Billman, Peter Canellos, Noël 
Cunningham, Victor Fleischer, Daniel Halperin, Joshua Holmes, Annie 
Jeong, Roy Katzovicz, Garrett Moritz, Deborah Paul, Alex Raskolnikov, 
Deborah Schenk, Bernard Wolfman, and Eric Zacks for their thoughtful 
suggestions, ideas and criticism.  Last, I dedicate this Article to my wife, 
Jessica Blumenfeld, for enduring my countless drafts, and to our son, 
Ariel, for providing us with the best form of continuity.  The views 
expressed herein are solely my own and should not be attributed to my 
firm or its clients. 
1 JERRY BOCK, FIDDLER ON THE ROOF (1964). 
2 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 354, 357, 361, 368 (2005). 
3 BOCK, supra note 1.  Mercifully, refrains of “If I were a tax lawyer . . 
.” have been omitted from this Article. 
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doctrine.4  The tax law contains a significant exception from 
the general requirement that taxpayers must recognize gains 
and losses upon an exchange of property for something 
“materially different” in the case of mergers that qualify as 
“reorganizations.”  These are special mergers that Congress 
has described as “mere changes in form” and “purely paper 
transactions” that do not merit current taxation.5  The courts 
developed the continuity of interest doctrine as a way to 
distinguish these special mergers from ordinary sales.6  
Under the doctrine, the shareholders of the target 
corporation (a “Target”) in a merger must receive a definite, 
material, and substantial proprietary interest in the acquiror 
corporation (an “Acquiror”) in exchange for their Target 
stock in order for the merger to qualify as a reorganization.7  
The doctrine has been refined to require that Target 
shareholders, in the aggregate, must receive merger 
 
4 The continuity of interest doctrine first emerged in 1932 in the 
Second Circuit decision, Cortland Specialty Co. v. Commissioner, 60 F.2d 
937 (2d Cir. 1932).  For excellent works providing general background on 
the continuity of interest doctrine, see BORIS I. BITTKER & JAMES S. 
EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 
¶ 12.21 (7th ed. 2004); MARTIN D. GINSBURG & JACK S. LEVIN, MERGERS, 
ACQUISITIONS AND BUYOUTS ¶ 610 (2004 ed.) (providing dozens of helpful 
examples that apply the continuity of interest doctrine); Jere D. McGaffey 
& Kenneth C. Hunt, Continuity of Shareholder Interest in Acquisitive 
Corporate Reorganizations, 59 TAXES 659 (1981); Michael L. Schulz, The 
Evolution of the Continuity of Interest Test, General Utilities Repeal and 
the Taxation of Corporate Acquisitions, 626 PLI/TAX 1165 (2004); Bernard 
Wolfman, Continuity of Interest and the American Law Institute Study, 57 
TAXES 840 (1979). 
5 S. REP. NO. 65-617, pt. 1, at 5 (1918); H.R. REP. NO. 68-179, at 16 
(1924). 
6 See infra Part II for a discussion of these decisions.  See also Treas. 
Reg. § 1.368-1(e) (as amended in 2005). 
7 Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(e) (as amended in 2005); Helvering v. Minn. 
Tea Co., 296 U.S. 378, 386 (1935) (transaction qualified as reorganization 
because Target shareholders acquired a “definite” and “substantial” 
interest in the Acquiror). 
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consideration that consists of at least forty percent Acquiror 
stock.8 
As the continuity of interest doctrine plays a pivotal role 
in determining whether a corporate merger is tax-deferred or 
taxable, it has been extolled as “the keystone of tax-free 
reorganizations,”9 “the bedrock upon which reorganization 
theory rests,”10 and “the glue that holds the reorganization 
provisions together.”11 
Despite this acclaim, the doctrine has also been subject to 
an abundance of criticism over the years.  It has been 
described as “an arbitrary, complex, if not Byzantine” 
doctrine,12 a doctrine reeking of “illogic,”13 and even a “sacred 
cow.”14  Taxpayers have complained that the continuity of 
interest doctrine is unclear, inefficient, and unfair.15  Critics 
claim that, under the doctrine, any one of a number of 
missteps before or after a merger could jeopardize its 
intended tax treatment. 
 
8 Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(e)(2)(v), ex. 1 (as amended in 2006) (aggregate 
merger consideration consisting of $40 worth of Acquiror stock and $60 
cash satisfied continuity of interest requirement). 
9 William J. Turnier, Continuity of Interest—Its Application to 
Shareholders of the Acquiring Corporation, 64 CAL. L. REV. 902, 902 
(1976). 
10 William T. Hutton, Musings on Continuity of Interest—Recent 
Developments, 56 TAXES 904, 904 (1979). 
11 Daniel Q. Posin, Taxing Corporate Reorganizations: Purging 
Penelope’s Web, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1335, 1371 (1985). 
12 Wolfman, supra note 4, at 840. 
13 Posin, supra note 11, at 1373. 
14 Peter L. Faber, Continuity of Interest and Business Enterprise: Is It 
Time to Bury Some Sacred Cows?, 34 TAX LAW 239, 239 (1981). 
15 The amount of commentary that fits into this category is too great 
to list even in a weighty footnote.  For a representative sampling, see 
BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 4, ¶ 12.21; Peter L. Faber, 
Postreorganization Sales and Continuity of Interest, 68 TAX NOTES 863 
(1995); Hutton, supra note 10; McGaffey & Hunt, supra note 4; David S. 
Miller, The Devotion and Inevitable Extinction of the Continuity of Interest 
Doctrine, 3 FLA. TAX REV. 187 (1996); Posin, supra note 11; Robert A. Rizzi, 
Continuity of Interest and Reorganizations: Toward a Unified Theory, 17 J. 
CORP. TAX’N 362 (1991); Turnier, supra note 9; Wolfman, supra note 4. 
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Over the last ten years, the federal government, through 
the U.S. Department of the Treasury (the “Treasury”) and 
the Internal Revenue Service (the “IRS”), has steadily 
chipped away at the continuity of interest doctrine in an 
attempt to alleviate taxpayer concerns.  These 
administrative agencies have repealed rules regarding, 
among other items, the amount of time that Target 
shareholders must retain Acquiror stock and whether an 
Acquiror must pay merger consideration to “historic” 
shareholders of the Target.16  Indeed, in September 2005, the 
Treasury addressed the fact that the value of Acquiror stock 
may fluctuate between the day on which a merger agreement 
is signed and the day on which the merger actually occurs, 
by issuing regulations that dramatically alter the manner in 
which continuity of interest is measured.17 
Although taxpayers have greeted these administrative 
efforts with near-universal applause,18 this approach fails to 
address fundamental questions.  The discussion of the proper 
role of the continuity of interest doctrine has reached a 
critical fork in the road.  The Treasury appears to have 
chosen to continue refurbishing this antiquated judicial 
concept into a set of rules with which taxpayers can learn to 
live.  The better route, however, is to confront the purpose 
that the continuity of interest doctrine currently serves and 
to question the role of the doctrine in delivering a special 
exception from the realization rule. 
This Article argues that the continuity of interest doctrine 
fails to distinguish between mergers that represent mere 
changes in form and those that should be considered 
ordinary sales.  More specifically, this Article asserts that 
the continuity of interest doctrine does not achieve its 
intended purpose—to identify mergers where an aggregate 
group of former Target shareholders maintain a “continuity 
of interest” in the Acquiror following the merger.  Today, 
corporate mergers may satisfy the continuity of interest 
 
16 Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(e) (as amended in 2005). 
17 Id. § 1.368-1(e)(2). 
18 See, e.g., GINSBURG & LEVIN, supra note 4, ch. 6. 
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requirement in form, but in substance, Target shareholders 
may receive or retain little meaningful proprietary interest 
in the Acquiror.  The typical criticism of the doctrine has 
ignored this fundamental defect.19  By highlighting the 
fictional premise on which the continuity of interest doctrine 
rests, this Article offers a different justification for repealing 
the doctrine. 
The second half of this Article offers a new alternative 
proposal (the “Proposal”) for replacing the continuity of 
interest doctrine.  In the past, alternatives to the continuity 
of interest doctrine, including the most prominent 
alternative offered by the American Law Institute in 1980,20 
have emphasized rejecting the continuity of interest doctrine 
in favor of an explicitly elective regime.  Those alternatives 
have aimed to increase administrative convenience and 
simplicity, but at the cost of devising rules that fail to serve 
any other policy objective. 
In contrast, the Proposal offered in this Article serves as 
an effective alternative to the continuity of interest doctrine 
in identifying special mergers that could be considered “mere 
changes in form” and where Target shareholders experience 
“purely paper transactions.”21 
This Article argues that whether a merger should be 
considered a mere change in form is highly dependent upon 
whether an Acquiror continues a Target’s historic business 
following a merger in a real and meaningful way.  Under the 
Proposal, at the corporate level, a merger will qualify for tax-
favored treatment as a “qualifying merger” if a Target 
merges into an Acquiror (transferring substantially all of its 
assets to the Acquiror) and the Acquiror continues the 
historic business of the Target for at least two years 
following the merger.  The Acquiror may conduct the historic 
business of the Target directly or may utilize substantially 
 
19 Part III infra describes the typical criticism of the continuity of 
interest doctrine (and the shortcomings of this criticism) in detail. 
20 A.L.I., FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT:  SUBCHAPTER C (1980). 
21 S. REP. NO. 65-617, pt. 1, at 5 (1918); H.R. REP. NO. 68-179, at 16 
(1924). 
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all of the assets of the Target in a business of the Acquiror 
that is of “like kind” to the Target’s historic business.  There 
is no requirement under the Proposal that the Acquiror pay 
Target shareholders any specified amount of Acquiror stock, 
cash, or any other type of property. 
The Article also contends that, at the shareholder level, 
changes in a Target shareholder’s particular circumstances 
after a merger should be considered in determining whether 
the shareholder has experienced a “purely paper 
transaction.”  The Proposal provides that Target 
shareholders will not be taxed upon the receipt of stock of an 
Acquiror into which the Target has merged in a qualifying 
merger.  There are two exceptions to this shareholder non-
recognition rule.  First, to the extent that a Target 
shareholder exchanges any voting stock for non-voting stock, 
or vice versa, the exchange will be taxable.  Second, if a 
former Target shareholder experiences a disproportionate 
reduction in his percentage interest (measured by either vote 
or value) as a result of the merger, then the Target 
shareholder’s exchange of any Target stock for Acquiror 
stock will be taxable.  There is no requirement under the 
Proposal, however, that Target shareholders receive any 
specified amount of Acquiror stock in order for the 
shareholder non-recognition rule to apply.  Target 
shareholders will be taxed, as under current law, on the 
receipt of any cash or other non-stock property to the extent 
of their realized gain. 
The remainder of this Article is presented in five parts.  
Part II offers a brief overview of the origin and rationale of 
the reorganization provisions.  Part III describes the typical 
criticism of the continuity of interest doctrine, and why it 
fails to offer compelling justification for repealing the 
doctrine.  Part IV offers a different argument for repealing 
the doctrine by asserting that the doctrine fails to serve its 
intended purpose.  Part V offers a new alternative to the 
continuity of interest doctrine by presenting the Proposal 
described briefly above.  Part VI is the conclusion. 
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II. OVERVIEW AND RATIONALE OF THE 
REORGANIZATION TRADITIONS 
After the management teams of two corporations have 
agreed to combine their businesses, their first task is to 
choose a transaction structure for their combination.22  The 
parties must decide whether the Acquiror should obtain the 
stock or the assets of the Target.  They must analyze, from a 
number of perspectives, whether a merger of the Target into 
the Acquiror, or into a subsidiary of the Acquiror, makes 
more sense.  One of the most important economic decisions 
that they must make is whether the combination should be 
structured as a currently taxable transaction or a tax-
deferred reorganization. 
In tax language, an acquisitive reorganization is a 
transaction in which an Acquiror obtains control over the 
stock or assets of a Target and the shareholders of the Target 
receive stock of the Acquiror (or of an affiliate of the 
Acquiror) in exchange for their Target stock.23  A transaction 
that qualifies as a reorganization under the tax law can 
result in especially favorable tax benefits to Target 
shareholders and to the Target itself.24 
 
22 For excellent discussions of the first steps that parties generally 
take to effect a corporate merger or acquisition, see generally MARTIN 
LIPTON & ERICA H. STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS AND FREEZEOUTS (2002 ed.); 
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Exclusive Merger Agreements and Lock-ups in 
Negotiated Corporate Acquisitions, 75 MINN. L. REV. 239 (1990); Dennis J. 
Block, Defensive Measures in Anticipation of and in Response to 
Unsolicited Takeover Proposals, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 623 (1997). 
23 The reorganization provisions of the Code are contained in I.R.C. § 
368(a) (2005).  The term “reorganization” has a different meaning in tax 
language than it does in other contexts.  To non-tax specialists, a 
“reorganization” may refer solely to a bankruptcy restructuring.  However, 
in tax language, a reorganization is a much broader concept, referring to 
mergers, consolidations, recapitalizations, divisions, asset or stock 
acquisitions, and other corporate transactions. 
24 Assuming, of course, that the parties do not desire to recognize 
taxable losses currently.  In a reorganization, a Target is not entitled to 
recognize a loss currently if it exchanges property under a plan of 
reorganization for stock, securities, or property of another corporation that 
is a party to the reorganization.  I.R.C. § 361(a) (2005).  Target 
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At the shareholder level, a Target shareholder does not 
recognize gain or loss currently in a reorganization if it 
receives solely Acquiror stock in exchange for its Target 
stock.25  Rather, the gain or loss realized is deferred until the 
Target shareholder disposes of the Acquiror stock received in 
the reorganization.  If the Target shareholder also receives 
cash or other property (referred to as “boot”) from the 
Acquiror, then the shareholder is required to recognize 
taxable gain at the time of the transaction, but only to the 
extent of the fair market value of the boot received.26 
At the corporate level, the Target does not recognize gain 
or loss on the transfer of its assets to the Acquiror or on the 
receipt of Acquiror stock or other property that it 
immediately distributes to its own shareholders.27 
If a forward merger fails to qualify as a reorganization, 
current taxation results at both the shareholder and 
corporate levels.28 
A. Overview of the Reorganization Traditions 
With certain exceptions, acquisitive reorganizations are 
subject to three overarching traditions, which are discussed 
separately below: the continuity of interest, the continuity of 
business enterprise, and the business purpose doctrines. 
 
shareholders also will not be allowed to recognize a loss currently if they 
exchange Target stock or securities for Acquiror stock or securities 
pursuant to a plan of reorganization.  I.R.C. § 354(a) (2005). 
25 I.R.C. § 354(a) (2005). 
26 Id. § 356(a). 
27 Id. §§ 354(a)(1), 361(a). 
28 A “forward” merger refers to a merger of a Target into the Acquiror 
or a subsidiary of the Acquiror, with the Acquiror, or the subsidiary of the 
Acquiror, surviving the merger.  The double incidence of taxation results 
from the classical model of the U.S. corporate tax system.  In this model, 
corporations and their shareholders are treated as separate persons 
(unless an election to disregard the separate existence of the corporation is 
available and exercised).  Consequently, in a failed corporate 
reorganization, both the Target and its shareholders are subject to current 
taxation. 
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1. The Continuity of Interest Doctrine 
The continuity of interest doctrine is the key determinant 
of a merger’s qualification as a reorganization.  The doctrine 
provides that Target shareholders must receive a definite, 
material, and substantial proprietary interest in the 
Acquiror in exchange for their Target shares in order for a 
merger to qualify as a reorganization.29  In determining 
whether an Acquiror delivers this type of interest to the 
Target shareholders, the continuity of interest doctrine 
considers the aggregate amount of Acquiror stock that the 
Target shareholders receive in a reorganization.30  Only 
Acquiror stock is respected as a sufficient continuing 
proprietary interest in the Acquiror.31 
Under the continuity of interest doctrine, as currently 
applied by the Treasury and the IRS, an Acquiror in a 
merger that qualifies as a reorganization must pay Target 
shareholders aggregate merger consideration consisting of at 
least 40 percent Acquiror stock.32  For example, if an 
Acquiror delivers merger consideration to Target 
shareholders consisting, in the aggregate, of $60 cash and 
forty Acquiror shares that are worth $1 each, this merger 
consideration satisfies the continuity of interest doctrine 
because it consists of forty percent Acquiror stock. 
The continuity of interest doctrine is a purely judicial 
creation.33  The decisions that formed the doctrine can be 
distilled into four distinct categories.  First, the courts held 
that in a merger qualifying as a reorganization, an Acquiror 
 
29 Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(e) (as amended in 2005). 
30 Rev. Proc. 77-37, 1977-2 C.B. 568. 
31 See, e.g., LeTulle v. Scofield, 308 U.S. 415 (1940); Pinellas Ice & 
Cold Storage Co. v. Comm’r, 287 U.S. 462 (1933). 
32 Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(e)(2)(v), ex. 1 (as amended in 2005). 
33 See Helvering v. Minn. Tea Co., 296 U.S. 378 (1935); John A. Nelson 
Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 374 (1935); Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. 
Comm’r, 287 U.S. 462 (1933); Cortland Specialty Co. v. Comm’r, 60 F.2d 
937 (2d Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 599 (1933).  See Erwin N. 
Griswold, Securities and Continuity of Interest, 58 HARV. L. REV. 705 
(1945) for a thorough discussion of the early judicial decisions leading to 
the continuity of interest doctrine. 
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must pay Target shareholders Acquiror stock in order to 
provide these shareholders with a “definite” continuing 
interest in the affairs of the Acquiror (the “What” 
decisions).34  Second, the courts dramatically expanded the 
doctrine by defining how much of the aggregate merger 
consideration must consist of Acquiror stock (courts blessed 
amounts ranging from 38.5 percent to 56 percent) (the “How 
Much” decisions).35  Third, the courts held that the Acquiror 
stock must be delivered not to just any Target shareholders, 
but to historic Target shareholders (the “Who” decisions).36  
Fourth, the courts established that post-reorganization sales 
of Acquiror stock by former Target shareholders could violate 
 
34 In Pinellas, the Supreme Court articulated the continuity of 
interest doctrine by providing that Target shareholders must acquire a 
“definite” interest in the affairs of the Acquiror.   As a result of Pinellas and 
several other “What” decisions, the continuity of interest doctrine held 
that only Acquiror stock would represent such a definite interest in the 
Acquiror.  See also Cortland Specialty Co. v. Comm’r, 60 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 
1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 599 (1933) (“[T]he primary requisite [of a 
reorganization] is that there must be some continuity of interest on the 
part of the transferor corporation or its stock holders.”). 
35 The Supreme Court significantly broadened the continuity of 
interest requirement in Helvering v. Minnesota Tea Co., 296 U.S. 378 
(1935), by establishing that Acquiror stock must represent a “substantial” 
and “material” part of the aggregate consideration paid by an Acquiror to a 
Target or its shareholders.  On the same day that it decided Minnesota 
Tea, the Supreme Court also held in John A. Nelson v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 
374 (1935), that Acquiror non-voting preferred stock (which comprised 
38.5 percent of the aggregate consideration delivered to Target 
shareholders) represented a “definite and substantial interest in the 
affairs of the [Acquiror] corporation,” and thus, satisfied the continuity of 
interest requirement. 
36 See, e.g., Yoc Heating Corp. v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 168 (1973), in 
which the Tax Court held that a transaction did not qualify as a 
reorganization if a sufficient quantum of Acquiror stock was not paid to 
“historic” shareholders of the Target, and J.E. Seagram Corp. v. 
Commissioner, 104 T.C. 75 (1995), where the Tax Court held that only 
Target stock that was purchased by the Acquiror itself prior to a 
reorganization (as was the case in Yoc Heating Corp.) counted against the 
historic continuity of interest requirement. 
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the continuity of interest requirement (the “How Long” 
decisions).37 
In recent years, the Treasury and the IRS have issued a 
significant amount of taxpayer-friendly guidance in response 
to taxpayer concerns that the continuity of interest doctrine 
was wreaking havoc in modern business transactions. 
For example, in 1998, the U.S. Treasury instituted a 
monumental change in the application of the continuity of 
interest doctrine when it issued rules providing that Target 
shareholders’ sales of Target stock prior to a reorganization 
and sales of Acquiror stock after a reorganization, in each 
case to parties unrelated to the Acquiror, are disregarded for 
continuity of interest purposes.38  These rules obviated the 
“Who” decisions and the “How Long” decisions. 
In addition, as recently as September 2005, the Treasury 
clarified the minimum threshold contemplated by the “How 
Much” decisions by establishing a clear forty percent 
guideline for taxpayers to use in determining whether the 
Acquiror stock to be paid to Target shareholders in a merger 
would represent a “substantial” amount of the total merger 
consideration.39  In those regulations, the Treasury also 
acknowledged that the value of Acquiror stock may fluctuate 
between the day on which a merger agreement is signed and 
the day on which the merger is closed by permitting 
taxpayers to use signing date values of Acquiror stock in 
 
37 The courts addressed this question in two judicial decisions that 
involved similar facts, Heintz v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 132 (1955), and 
McDonald’s Restaurants of Illinois v. Commissioner, 688 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 
1982).  In Heintz, Target shareholders (who wanted cash for their Target 
shares) received Acquiror stock on the condition that the Acquiror help 
those shareholders dispose of the stock after the merger.  In McDonald’s, 
the Target shareholders sold Acquiror stock received in a merger 
immediately after the merger and pursuant to a prearranged plan.  In 
each of these cases, the Target shareholders sold their Acquiror stock for 
cash to third parties unrelated to the Acquiror.  The court in each case 
held that the post-reorganization sales violated the continuity of interest 
requirement. 
38 Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(e) (as amended in 2005). 
39 See id. § 1.368-1(e)(2). 
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certain instances to perform the continuity of interest 
calculation.40 
2. The Continuity of Business Enterprise 
Doctrine 
An acquisitive reorganization must also satisfy the 
continuity of business enterprise requirement.41  An Acquiror 
must continue the Target’s historic business following a 
reorganization, or it must use a significant portion of the 
Target’s business assets in its own business.42  In contrast to 
the continuity of interest requirement, however, the 
continuity of business enterprise requirement under current 
law has not been viewed as particularly onerous to 
taxpayers.43 
3. The Business Purpose Doctrine 
Last, each reorganization must be motivated by a 
legitimate business purpose.44  In the acquisitive (as opposed 
to the divisive) reorganization context, the business purpose 
requirement is also easy to satisfy.45  The mere fact that a 
Target would agree to combine with an unrelated Acquiror 
 
40 Id. 
41 Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(d)(1) (as amended in 2006) (“Continuity of 
business enterprise (COBE) requires that the issuing corporation (P) .  .  . 
either continue the target corporation’s (T’s) historic business or use a 
significant portion of T’s historic business assets in a business.”). 
42 Id. 
43 CHERYL D. BLOCK, CORPORATE TAXATION 347 (2d ed. 2002). 
44 Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935) (stating that the 
transaction “was in fact an elaborate and devious form of conveyance 
masquerading as a corporate reorganization, and nothing else . . . .”); see 
Arthur M. Michaelson, “Business Purpose” and Tax-Free Reorganization, 
61 YALE L.J. 14 (1952) (providing an overview of the business purpose 
doctrine in the context of acquisitive reorganizations); Harvey M. Spear, 
‘Corporate Business Purpose’ in Reorganization, 3 TAX L. REV. 225 (1947). 
45 See Louis S. Freeman, General Overview and Strategies in 
Representing Sellers, 618 PLI/Tax 7 (2004) (observing that “the business 
purpose requirement as applied to acquisitive reorganizations is 
substantially less stringent than the requirement as applied to spinoffs”). 
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implies that the Target’s management believes that the 
combination will yield valuable synergies, that the Acquiror 
will provide new strategic direction to the business of the 
former Target or that the Target is simply in need of capital 
to run its business.46 
B. Specific Forms of Acquisitive Reorganizations 
An acquisitive reorganization must also meet the specific 
statutory requirements of one of the reorganization 
provisions of the Code.  Several of these forms of 
reorganization contain more stringent requirements than the 
general traditions described above.  Specifically, the judicial 
continuity of interest doctrine is only relevant in the case of 
statutory mergers and forward triangular mergers.47  
Consequently, those two reorganization forms are the focus 
of this Article.48 
1. Statutory Merger 
A statutory merger of the Target directly into the 
Acquiror, in which Target shareholders receive stock of the 
Acquiror, qualifies as a reorganization.49  In this transaction, 
the Acquiror is the surviving corporate entity after the 
 
46 If, on the other hand, the transaction appears to be motivated in 
significant part by a desire to avoid federal income taxes, then a careful 
analysis of all the purposes motivating the reorganization is necessary.  As 
Judge Hand famously wrote in Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 811 (2d 
Cir. 1934), “the meaning of a sentence may be more than that of the 
separate words, as a melody is more than the notes.” 
47 The other acquisitive forms of reorganization contain specific 
statutory provisions that dictate the contents of the consideration to be 
paid by the Acquiror.  See I.R.C. §§ 368(a)(1)(B), (C) and (a)(2)(E) (2005). 
48 This article, thus, does not address statutory requirements 
regarding the amounts of Acquiror stock that must be paid to Target 
shareholders in other types of reorganizations, such as reorganizations 
under I.R.C. §§ 368(a)(1)(B), (C) or (a)(2)(E) (2005). 
49 I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(A) (2005). 
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merger.50  There are no restrictions here as to the type of 
consideration paid to the Target shareholders as long as the 
judicial continuity of interest requirement described above is 
satisfied.51  The statutory merger generally has been viewed 
as the least restrictive of the specific reorganization forms.52 
2. Forward Triangular Merger 
In a forward triangular merger, the Target merges into a 
corporate subsidiary of the Acquiror (rather than into the 
Acquiror itself), and the Target shareholders receive stock of 
the Acquiror.53  The surviving corporate entity in this merger 
is the corporate subsidiary of the Acquiror.  This transaction 
will qualify as a reorganization if the corporate subsidiary of 
the Acquiror acquires “substantially all” of the Target’s 
assets,54 Target shareholders do not receive any stock of the 
corporate subsidiary of the Acquiror,55 and, again, the 
judicial continuity of interest doctrine described above is 
satisfied. 
 
50 See Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(b)(1)(ii) (as amended in 2006) for specific 
requirements of a statutory merger or consolidation under I.R.C. § 
368(a)(1)(A) (2005). 
51 Other specific forms of acquisitive reorganizations, by contrast, 
require that only voting stock may be paid to Target shareholders.  See 
I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(B) (2005). 
52 See BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 4, ¶ 12.22 (citing statutory 
mergers under I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(A) (2005) as “the oldest of, and the 
prototype for, the various reorganization forms”); Thomas P. Fitzgerald et 
al., Corporate Mergers, Acquisitions and Reorganizations, 626 PLI/TAX 707 
(2004). 
53 I.R.C. § 368(a)(2)(D) (2005).  The key advantage to this transaction 
structure, as opposed to a statutory merger, is that the Target’s liabilities 
become those of the corporate subsidiary of the Acquiror rather than of the 
Acquiror itself. 
54 The IRS views at least 90 percent of the Target’s net assets and 70 
percent of the Target’s gross assets as substantial.  Rev. Proc. 86-42, 1986-
2 C.B. 722 amplifying Rev. Proc. 77-37, 1977-2 C.B. 568. 
55 I.R.C. § 368(a)(2)(D)(i) (2005). 
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C. Rationale of the Reorganization Traditions 
The primary explanation for Congress’s enactment of the 
reorganization provisions is that Congress believed that 
certain mergers constituted “purely paper transactions” and 
“mere changes in form”56 that should not be subject to 
current taxation.57  The reorganization provisions thus 
represent Congress’s express desire to exempt certain types 
of mergers and other transactions from the realization rule 
of our tax system.58  According to the drafters of the 
reorganization provisions, it would not be appropriate to tax 
Target shareholders on their stock-for-stock exchanges in 
these types of transactions because they did not cash out 
their original investment, and thus, they did not experience 
a realization event.59  In the eyes of the drafters, a 
 
56 In 1918, the Senate Finance Committee commented that the 
nonrecognition principle under the reorganization provisions was intended 
to “negative the assertion of tax in the case of certain purely paper 
transactions.”  S. REP. NO. 65-617, pt. 1, at 5 (1918).  See also H.R. REP. 
NO. 68-179 (1924); S. REP. NO. 68-398, at 17-18 (1924) (commenting that 
the reorganization provisions are “mere changes in form and not in 
substance, and consequently should not be considered as affecting a 
realization of income at the time of the exchange”). 
57 The development of the modern reorganization provisions of the 
Code can be traced to the period immediately following World War I and 
stretching until 1934.  Congress enacted the first reorganization 
provisions in the Revenue Act of 1918, which provided that no taxable gain 
or loss would occur with respect to stock or securities received by a Target 
shareholder “in connection with the reorganization, merger or 
consolidation of a corporation.”  Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 202(b), 40 
Stat. 1057, 1060 (1919).  See Steven A. Bank, Mergers, Taxes and 
Historical Realism, 75 TUL. L. REV. 1 (2000), for a thorough discussion of 
the history of the reorganization provisions. 
58 For a positive description of the realization rule, see Deborah H. 
Schenk, A Positive Account of the Realization Rule, 57 TAX L. REV. 355 
(2004). 
59 See H.R. REP. NO. 68-179, pt. 1, at 16 (1924); S. REP. NO. 68-398, pt. 
1, at 17-18 (1924) (commenting that reorganizations represent mere 
“changes in form not substance”).  The tax law requires that a “material” 
modification to a taxpayer’s investment must occur in order for gain 
realized to give rise to income.  See Cottage Sav. Ass’n v. Comm’r, 499 U.S. 
554 (1991) (exchange of property triggers realization event when 
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realization event could only occur when the former Target 
shareholders disposed of their Acquiror stock received in a 
reorganization in exchange for “materially” different 
property, such as cash.60 
Commentators have argued that the reorganization 
provisions serve a number of other policy objectives, such as 
subsidizing corporate combinations61 and relieving taxpayers 
of liquidity62 and valuation63 hardships that could result from 
the taxation of stock-for-stock exchanges that occur pursuant 
to certain mergers.  This Article makes no attempt to probe 
the normative justifications for the reorganization 
provisions.  Rather, this Article considers whether the 
continuity of interest doctrine effectively identifies mergers 
that could be characterized as “mere changes in form” and 
 
exchanged properties are “materially different”); Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(a) 
(1996). 
60 See A.W. Gregg, Treasury Expert Explains Tax Bill, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 5, 1924, at 1.  Gregg, a Treasury official in the 1920s, noted that 
Congress did not intend the reorganization provisions to apply to ordinary 
sales. 
61 Senator Watson, one of the original drafters of the reorganization 
provisions, stated that “at a time when so much reorganization is going on 
in the business world, it is thought by all those interested in the 
upbuilding of the industries of the country at this time that this is a very 
helpful provision.”  61 CONG. REC. 6563 (1921).  See Jerome R. Hellerstein, 
Mergers, Taxes, and Realism, 71 HARV. L. REV. 254, 276 (1957) (describing 
efficiency as one of the principal rationales of the reorganization 
provisions).  The author criticized this rationale, however, by commenting 
that “Congress has not seriously considered the wisdom of granting non-
recognition to reorganization exchanges.” Id. at 276 n.22. 
62 See ROBERT S. HOLZMAN, CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS: THEIR 
FEDERAL TAX STATUS 68 (1948) (“If an exchange is deemed taxable and yet 
the taxpayer has received nothing that is more than a paper profit, where 
is he going to get the money to pay the tax?”). 
63 See Bank, supra note 57 (“Adams rationalized the existence of the 
reorganization provision on the ground that ‘it is difficult to make 
appraisals.  In the average reorganization, or in many reorganizations, 
there is no definite, fixed market price for the securities.’”) (quoting An Act 
to Reduce and Equalize Taxation, to Amend and Simplify the Revenue Act 
of 1918, and for Other Purposes: Hearing on H.R. 8245 Before the S. 
Comm. on Fin., 67th Cong. 29 (1921) (statement of Prof. T.S. Adams)). 
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“purely paper transactions,” the types of mergers upon which 
Congress intended to bestow special tax treatment. 
III. TYPICAL CRITICISM OF THE CONTINUITY OF 
INTEREST DOCTRINE 
Taking shots at the continuity of interest doctrine is a 
tradition among tax scholars and practitioners that is almost 
as old as the doctrine itself.  Not surprisingly, the criticism 
has tended to fall into some familiar categories.  Three of the 
most common charges levied against the doctrine are that it 
contains unclear requirements, provokes transactional 
inefficiency, and results in unfair outcomes.64  Despite the 
repeated articulation of these claims, they are not compelling 
justifications for repealing the doctrine.  None of them 
addresses the more fundamental question of whether the 
continuity of interest doctrine is an appropriate means of 
distinguishing between a merger that is a mere change in 
form and one that is an ordinary sale.  This Part briefly 
describes the typical criticisms and their shortcomings. 
A. Lack of Clarity 
A common criticism of the continuity of interest doctrine 
is that its requirements are unclear.  The doctrine requires 
that an Acquiror must pay a “substantial” amount of 
Acquiror stock to Target shareholders in order for a merger 
to qualify as a reorganization.65  But how much Acquiror 
stock is enough?  Acquiror stock thresholds ranging from 56 
percent66 to 50 percent67 to 38.5 percent68 of aggregate merger 
consideration have all been cited with approval by the courts 
and the IRS as providing a sufficient continuing interest to 
 
64 See, e.g., Faber, supra note 14; Hutton, supra note 10; Miller, supra 
note 15; Posin, supra note 11; Wolfman, supra note 4. 
65 Helvering v. Minn. Tea Co., 296 U.S. 378 (holding that Acquiror 
stock must consist of “a substantial part of the value of the thing 
transferred”). 
66 Id. 
67 Rev. Proc. 77-37, 1977-2 C.B. 568. 
68 John A. Nelson Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 374 (1935). 
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Target shareholders.  Because the required minimum 
threshold is not definite, so the argument goes, parties to a 
merger lack certainty that their merger consideration 
consists of the proper amount of Acquiror stock.69  Without 
clear rules, the parties risk stumbling into a fully taxable 
transaction.  This lack of certainty has been criticized as 
tending “to interfere with transactions at the fringes and 
otherwise to contribute to the heartburn of tax lawyers.”70 
Although the lack of clarity argument is frequently 
offered, it does not support the outright repeal of the 
doctrine.  If proponents of this argument find ambiguity 
regarding the minimum required percentage of Acquiror 
stock troubling, then they should argue in favor of more 
definitive guidelines.  Judges, not Congress, created the 
continuity of interest doctrine, and so it is understandable 
that the minimum required amount of Acquiror stock has 
varied from case to case.  Indeed, over the past few years, the 
Treasury and the IRS have made a serious effort to set a 
clear minimum threshold amount.  In September 2005, the 
Treasury issued final regulations that state that merger 
consideration consisting of forty percent Acquiror stock will 
satisfy the continuity of interest requirement.71  The new 
bright line requirement thus puts an end to the inquiry 
regarding how much Acquiror stock is enough.  The more 
important question is whether the payment of any Acquiror 
stock to Target shareholders is an indication that a Target 
has undergone a mere change in form. 
B. Transactional Inefficiency 
A related criticism of the doctrine is that it results in an 
unreasonable amount of transactional inefficiency.  
Proponents of this criticism typically argue that lawyers for 
parties entering into merger agreements devote too much 
time to negotiating the means by which the continuity of 
 
69 See BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 4; GINSBURG & LEVIN, supra note 
4, ¶ 610. 
70 Miller, supra note 15. 
71 Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(e)(2)(v), ex. 1 (as amended in 2005). 
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interest requirement will be satisfied instead of more 
important business issues.72 
For example, in most public company mergers, the 
merger agreement conditions the closing of the merger on 
the receipt by each of the Acquiror and the Target of a 
written opinion of counsel that the transaction will qualify as 
a reorganization.73  If the lawyers for each party to the 
merger have different views on the proper amount of 
Acquiror stock that must be paid to Target shareholders to 
satisfy the continuity of interest requirement, then the 
parties could find themselves at a standstill.74 
Also, in the past, transactional inefficiency resulted 
because continuity of interest was tested using the value of 
Acquiror stock on the day on which a merger actually 
occurred, rather than on the day on which the merger 
agreement was signed.75  Parties would expend valuable time 
negotiating extremely complex “tax treatment preservation” 
 
72 See Jasper L. Cummings, Jr., Reorganization Tax Opinions, 452 
PLI/TAX 897 (1999) (“Does it matter how close to ‘the edge’ (be it 40 
percent or 50 percent) of continuity you are?  Yes, as difficult questions 
can be avoided if the relevant line could not be crossed under any 
circumstances.”). 
73 See Edward D. Herlihy et al., Financial Institutions Mergers and 
Acquisitions 2001: Adapting to the Challenges of a Changing Landscape, 
1299 PLI/CORP 11 (2002) (“[I]n part-stock/part-cash transactions intended 
to qualify as tax-free reorganizations, customary closing conditions that 
each party receive a tax opinion from its respective counsel may . . . give 
each party a right to walk away from the deal if the buyer’s stock price 
declines significantly enough to threaten meeting the ‘continuity of 
interest’ requirement . . . (i.e., that stock represent at least 40 to 45 
percent of merger consideration value at closing)”). 
74 See id. 
75 See N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Tax Section, Report on Continuity of 
Interest and Pre-Closing Stock Value Fluctuation, 102 TAX NOTES 596 
(2004), for a thorough description of this problem.  See also LIPTON & 
STEINBERGER, supra note 22, §10.02; Deborah L. Paul, IRS to Ease 
Continuity Requirements for Part-Cash/Part-Stock Deals, 8 No. 5 M & A 
LAW. 11, 11 (2004) (stating that the “current practice of measuring 
continuity of proprietary interest at closing is awkward”); Adam Sohn, A-
Signing Continuity of Interest (2004) (unpublished article, on file with 
author). 
BLANK_FINAL.DOC 2/28/2006  10:39:53 PM 
22 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2006 
provisions designed to ensure that the continuity of interest 
requirement would be satisfied even if the value of the 
Acquiror’s stock dropped between the signing and closing 
dates.76 
The argument that the continuity of interest doctrine 
results in transactional inefficiency is largely obsolete.  First, 
the Treasury’s new bright line forty percent Acquiror stock 
threshold should reduce transactional inefficiency.  
Differences of opinion between counsel over the appropriate 
amount of Acquiror stock that must be paid to Target 
shareholders should disappear.  Second, in September 2005, 
the Treasury issued final regulations that address the 
fluctuation issue.77  These regulations appear to alleviate the 
fluctuation concern and the need for complicated tax 
treatment preservation provisions in most merger 
agreements. 
Further, even if the continuity of interest doctrine 
resulted in transactional inefficiency, that consequence alone 
should not merit the doctrine’s repeal.  Taxpayers in 
reorganizations receive a very special benefit—neither the 
Target nor the Target shareholders are subject to the 
realization rule that would require them to pay current tax.  
In light of this benefit, it is understandable that they are 
forced to satisfy a requirement intended to distinguish a 
special merger from an ordinary sale, even if their effort 
results in incidental transactional inefficiency. 
C. Unfair Outcomes 
Vocal opponents of the continuity of interest doctrine 
have long argued for its repeal as a result of the unfair 
 
76 See Paul, supra note 75, at 11 (“Many merger agreements contain a 
provision that increases the amount of stock consideration and decreases 
the amount of cash consideration if an adjustment is required in order to 
satisfy the continuity requirement and obtain the tax opinion.  In some 
cases, those price adjustments are heavily negotiated.  In all cases, as a 
business matter, the parties would just as well do without such price 
adjustments.”). 
77 Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(e)(2) (as amended in 2005). 
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outcomes that they contend it produces, particularly with 
respect to minority Target shareholders.78  The continuity of 
interest doctrine may cause a minority Target shareholder 
that exchanges her Target stock solely for Acquiror stock to 
suffer current taxation in the event that too many of her 
fellow Target shareholders receive cash in exchange for their 
Target shares. 
The Tax Court considered these facts in Kass v. 
Commissioner.79  In that case, the Tax Court held that Mrs. 
Kass, a minority shareholder who elected to receive solely 
Acquiror stock in a merger, engaged in a taxable exchange 
because the consideration paid in the aggregate to Target 
shareholders failed to satisfy the continuity of interest 
requirement.80 
Critics argue that it is inequitable to tax minority 
shareholders, like Mrs. Kass, who desire to continue their 
proprietary interest following a merger simply because of the 
actions of their fellow shareholders.81  They contend that the 
continuity of interest doctrine requires minority 
shareholders to obtain sophisticated tax advice in order to 
understand the tax consequences of exchanging shares or 
receiving cash.82  Consequently, the continuity of interest 
doctrine has the potential to penalize minority shareholders. 
The treatment of minority shareholders, however, is not a 
sufficient justification for repeal of the continuity of interest 
doctrine.  The purpose of the continuity of interest doctrine is 
to classify a merger as a mere change in form because a 
significant number of former Target shareholders continue to 
own an interest in the Acquiror after the merger.  If we 
assume that the premise of the doctrine is valid (although 
this premise is questioned below), then Mrs. Kass should 
have suffered current taxation because her merger did not 
result in continued ownership by a significant number of 
 
78 See, e.g., Wolfman, supra note 4; Posin, supra note 11. 
79 60 T.C. 218 (1973). 
80 Id. 
81 See Wolfman, supra note 4. 
82 See id. 
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former Target shareholders, and consequently, was not a 
mere change in form of the Target.  Whether the Target 
underwent a mere change in form, rather than Mrs. Kass’s 
position as a minority or majority shareholder, should 
determine whether her stock-for-stock exchange is taxable. 
It is also inappropriate to repeal the continuity of interest 
doctrine for the purpose of equalizing treatment between 
majority and minority shareholders.  Minority shareholders 
assume the risk of a variety of adverse consequences (both 
tax- and non-tax-related) by virtue of holding their shares in 
the minority.83  For example, a corporation’s decision to 
merge with another entity or to amend its charter are 
decisions that may directly impact minority shareholders’ 
interests, but are beyond the control of these shareholders as 
a result of their minority position.  The imposition of adverse 
tax consequences on minority shareholders due to the actions 
of other shareholders is no different.  The corporate law, not 
the tax law, should bear the responsibility for protecting the 
rights of minority shareholders. 
IV. CONTINUITY OF INTEREST: A TRADITION OF 
FICTION 
The typical criticism of the continuity of interest doctrine 
is unpersuasive, in large part, because it fails to ask deeper 
questions about the doctrine.  The basic premise of the 
continuity of interest doctrine is that continued ownership by 
a significant proportion of former Target shareholders in an 
Acquiror following a merger is the key indicator that a 
Target has undergone merely a change in form.84  Effectively, 
the doctrine judges whether a thing has changed by looking 
to its owners rather than to the thing itself.  This premise is 
questionable. 
The shareholders of a corporation have a myriad of 
unique characteristics and intentions.  In many corporations, 
 
83 See generally, Douglas K. Moll, Shareholder Oppression in Close 
Corporations: The Unanswered Question of Perspective, 53 VAND. L. REV. 
749 (2000). 
84 BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 4, ¶ 12.21. 
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there is no indication that shareholders think, speak, or act 
with any degree of coordination.  Yet, the continuity of 
interest doctrine implies that a Target’s identity is 
inextricably linked to its historic shareholder base.  
Moreover, if a certain proportion of those shareholders fail to 
continue to hold an ownership interest in the repackaged 
Target following a merger, then the doctrine considers the 
Target to have undergone something more than a mere 
change in form. 
But even if we accept this premise—that continued 
historic shareholder ownership is critical to the mere-
change-in-form inquiry—there is an even more basic 
question to be addressed.  Does the continuity of interest 
doctrine work? 
This Part argues that the continuity of interest doctrine 
should be repealed because it fails to serve its intended 
purpose.  In many mergers that qualify as reorganizations, 
the concept of a minimum quantum of proprietary interests 
in the Target continuing as proprietary interests in the 
Acquiror is fiction.  Because the doctrine does not identify 
effectively those mergers where Target shareholders actually 
continue their proprietary interests following a merger, it 
certainly cannot distinguish between a merger that is a mere 
change in form and one that is an ordinary sale. 
A. Something Completely Different 
One might think that when Target shareholders 
“continue” their proprietary interests following a merger that 
is a mere change in form, they hold stock in an Acquiror that 
conducts either the business of the former Target or at least 
a similar business.85  Why then, one might ask, would Target 
 
85 Such an assumption would seem particularly plausible given the 
requirements of other non-recognition provisions of the Code.  For 
example, I.R.C. § 1031 (2005) offers non-recognition treatment to 
taxpayers when property held for productive use in a trade or business or 
for investment is exchanged solely for property of a like kind to be held 
either for productive use in a trade or business or for investment.  
However, the property to be exchanged must be of “like kind” in nature 
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shareholders be deemed to have continued an interest in the 
Target by holding stock in the Acquiror?86 
Despite this intuition, current law does not contain a 
meaningful requirement that Target shareholders own stock, 
following a merger, in an Acquiror that conducts the 
business of the Target or even a business similar to the 
Target’s, in order to satisfy the continuity of interest 
doctrine.87  In fact, Target shareholders may exchange their 
stock in a Target that conducts one business for stock in an 
Acquiror that conducts, in the immortal words of Monty 
Python, “something completely different.”88 
The tax law contains rules requiring an Acquiror in a 
reorganization to “continue” the business enterprise of a 
Target following a merger that qualifies as a reorganization.  
These rules, however, have frequently been criticized as 
“rather loose and reasonably easy to satisfy.”89  The key part 
of a corporation’s identity, its business activities, can be 
unrecognizably transformed as a result of a merger that 
qualifies as a reorganization without breaching these rules. 
In these types of mergers, it is difficult to argue that 
Target shareholders, no matter how many receive stock in 
the Acquiror, continue their proprietary interests—at least, 
in the same way as before the merger—at all.  Consider the 
following relatively simple hypothetical. 
For the past forty years, Farmer Brown has operated a 
local dairy business in Delaware through his wholly owned 
 
and character.  Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-1(b) (as amended in 2002).  As the 
following discussion illustrates, the continuity of interest doctrine and the 
reorganization provisions contain no such “like kind” requirement. 
86 Indeed, the plain English definition of the word “continuity” is 
“uninterrupted duration or continuation especially without essential 
change.”  MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2005). 
87 The relevant regulations require that an Acquiror “continue” the 
business of the Target.  Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(d)(i) (as amended in 2005).  
There is no requirement (bright line or implied) that the Acquiror continue 
the business of the Target for a set amount of time. 
88 My sincere apologies to Monty Python for subjecting it to the world 
of corporate tax.  See MONTY PYTHON, AND NOW FOR SOMETHING 
COMPLETELY DIFFERENT (1971). 
89 BLOCK, supra note 43. 
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corporation, Small Cheesecorp.  The heart of his business 
activity has been delivering cheese products to the local 
residents and businesses of his county.  One day, Farmer 
Brown receives an unsolicited takeover offer from Acme 
Purse Company, a large producer of women’s leather 
products.  Acme Purse Company is very interested in 
acquiring Farmer Brown’s valuable cattle supply and using 
it, not for cheese, but for leather purse production.  The 
acquisition will be structured as a reorganization in which 
Acme Purse Company will pay Farmer Brown merger 
consideration consisting entirely of Acme Purse Company 
stock in exchange for his Small Cheesecorp stock, and Small 
Cheesecorp will be merged into Acme Purse Company.90  
Farmer Brown accepts Acme Purse Company’s offer and the 
transaction closes.  Because Farmer Brown exchanges his 
Small Cheesecorp stock for merger consideration consisting 
solely of Acme Purse Company stock, the continuity of 
interest requirement is easily satisfied.91 
Even though Farmer Brown owns stock in a very 
different corporation following the merger than he did before 
the merger, Farmer Brown is deemed to have “continued” his 
proprietary interest.  Before the merger, Small Cheesecorp 
was the embodiment of Farmer Brown’s personal business 
skills and interests—cheese production.  After the merger of 
Small Cheesecorp into Acme Purse Company, Farmer 
Brown’s proprietary interest relates to a business in which 
he has little knowledge or interest—women’s leather purse 
production.  The continuity of business enterprise rules 
under current law enable the merger to qualify as a 
reorganization as long as Acme Purse Company uses 
substantially all of Small Cheesecorp’s assets in “a” 
business.92  Because the rules do not require Acme Purse 
Company’s business to be similar to Small Cheesecorp’s 
business, the corporate identity of Small Cheesecorp 
 
90 The Acme Purse Company/Small Cheesecorp merger is intended to 
qualify as a reorganization under I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(A) (2005). 
91 Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(e) (as amended in 2005). 
92 Id. § 1.368-1(d)(i). 
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disappears in the merger.  Farmer Brown, nonetheless, is 
treated as “continuing” his proprietary interest as though 
nothing more than a mere change in form has occurred.  This 
characterization is fiction. 
The continuity of interest and continuity of business 
enterprise rules under current law are linked.  
Commentators have criticized the lax nature of the 
continuity of business enterprise requirement, but they do 
not identify the link between those rules and the continuity 
of interest requirement.93  One of the reasons that the 
continuity of interest requirement serves a fictional premise 
is that there is no clear rule that the Acquiror must preserve 
the corporate identity of the Target (its historic business) 
following a merger in a real and meaningful way.  Without 
such a requirement, Target shareholders like Farmer Brown 
are depicted as continuing their proprietary interests 
irrespective of the material change that those interests may 
have undergone. 
B. Disproportionate Changes in Proportionate Interest 
The continuity of interest doctrine does not require a 
Target shareholder to continue to own a proportionate 
interest in the Acquiror after a merger that is similar to the 
proportionate interest that it owned in the Target prior to 
the merger.94  Just as the size of an Acquiror relative to that 
of a Target is irrelevant for continuity of interest purposes,95 
so too is the comparison of the Target shareholder’s 
proportionate interest in the Target with the proportionate 
 
93 See BLOCK, supra note 43. 
94 The relevant Treasury regulations state that “[a] proprietary 
interest in the target corporation is preserved if, in a potential 
reorganization, it is exchanged for a proprietary interest in the issuing 
corporation . . . , it is exchanged by the acquiring corporation for a direct 
interest in the target corporation enterprise, or it otherwise continues as a 
proprietary interest in the target corporation.”  Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(e) (as 
amended in 2005). 
95 Whether measured in terms of the Acquiror’s market capitalization, 
net asset value, or revenue, in the world of continuity of interest, size does 
not matter. 
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interest that the Target shareholder will hold in the 
Acquiror.96  Consequently, a Target shareholder holding 
stock representing a large proportionate interest (whether in 
terms of voting power or value) in the Target can exchange 
his Target stock for Acquiror stock that represents a 
relatively insignificant proportionate interest in the Acquiror 
without violating the continuity of interest requirement. 
To appreciate this surprising allowance, consider the 
following variation on the previous example: There are 1,000 
shares of Small Cheesecorp stock outstanding, and Farmer 
Brown owns all 1,000 shares.  Farmer Brown thus owns one 
hundred percent of the stock of Small Cheesecorp.  Big 
Cheesecorp, the largest producer and distributor of cheese in 
the Eastern United States, offers to acquire Small 
Cheesecorp.  The transaction will be structured as a 
reorganization in which Big Cheesecorp will pay Farmer 
Brown 1,000 shares of Big Cheesecorp stock (worth $100,000 
in the aggregate) in exchange for Farmer Brown’s stock in 
Small Cheesecorp, and Small Cheesecorp will be merged into 
Big Cheesecorp.97  There are approximately 100,000,000 
shares of Big Cheesecorp stock outstanding and traded on 
the New York Stock Exchange.  Farmer Brown accepts Big 
Cheesecorp’s proposal.  Again, because Farmer Brown 
exchanges his Small Cheesecorp stock for merger 
consideration consisting solely of Big Cheesecorp stock, the 
continuity of interest requirement is satisfied.98 
In this transaction, Farmer Brown’s proportionate 
interest has changed dramatically.  Whereas Farmer Brown 
owned 100 percent of Small Cheesecorp before the merger, 
Farmer Brown now owns a mere .001 percent of Big 
Cheesecorp after the merger.99  Table 1 below illustrates the 
 
96 See also Posin, supra note 11 (observing that there is no 
requirement regarding relative size in the continuity of interest 
regulations). 
97 The Big Cheesecorp/Small Cheesecorp merger is intended to qualify 
as a reorganization under I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(A) (2005). 
98 Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(e) (as amended in 2005). 
99 As a result of the merger, Farmer Brown’s proportionate interest 
has plummeted 99.999 percent. 
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change in Farmer Brown’s proportionate interest following 
the merger: 
 
Table 1.  Farmer Brown’s Relative Proportionate Interests in 
Small Cheesecorp and Big Cheesecorp 
 




Shares Owned by Farmer 
Brown 1,000 1,000 
Total Shares Outstanding 1,000 100,000,000 
Farmer Brown’s 
Proportionate Interest 100% .001% 
 
Prior to the merger, Farmer Brown was completely in 
control of the corporate actions of Small Cheesecorp.  He 
decided who would run his cheesemaking equipment and 
maybe even how long his cheese would hang or at what 
temperature it would be prepared.  However, after the 
merger, Farmer Brown is just another minority shareholder, 
owning an interest representing one thousandth of a percent 
of Big Cheesecorp.  He cannot direct the corporate actions of 
the company; instead his role is relegated to attending 
shareholder meetings and occasionally voting for directors of 
the company in annual shareholder elections.  His voting 
power, though, represents only 1,000 out of 100,000,000 
votes.100 
Once again, Farmer Brown has exchanged his proprietary 
interest in Small Cheesecorp for stock in something 
completely different.  As a result of the merger, Farmer 
Brown has experienced a very significant change in his role 
as a shareholder, as he has been transformed from a sole 
shareholder who controlled nearly all corporate decisions to 
one who has an almost infinitesimal role in corporate 
 
100 It is likely that, given Farmer Brown’s relatively minuscule 
influence over the corporate affairs of Big Cheesecorp, Farmer Brown may 
not even participate in routine shareholder meetings.  See Arthur D. 
Spratlin, Jr., Modern Remedies for Oppression in the Closely Held 
Corporation, 60 MISS. L.J. 405, 405 (1990) (discussing rights of minority 
shareholders in a publicly held corporation). 
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decisionmaking.  Yet, the continuity of interest doctrine 
holds that Farmer Brown has continued his interest, 
experiencing a mere “readjustment” of his investment. 
Other commentators have noted that the treatment of a 
merger of a small private company into a large public 
company as a reorganization represents a weakness in the 
continuity of interest doctrine.  However, their analysis 
tends to focus on the “marketable” nature of the stock in a 
publicly traded Acquiror that Target shareholders receive.101  
Because the Acquiror stock received in these mergers is 
marketable, Target shareholders can quickly dispose of it for 
cash.102  Commentators contend that the liquid nature of 
such Acquiror stock is contrary to the concept of continuity of 
interest. 
This Part has offered a different argument by 
emphasizing the change in proportionate interest 
experienced by the Target shareholder, rather than the 
marketable nature of the Acquiror stock received.  That a 
public market exists in which a former Target shareholder 
can easily dispose of his newly received Acquiror stock 
following a merger does not necessarily mean that the Target 
shareholder is not able to continue his proprietary interest.  
After all, a large privately held Target could just as easily 
merge into a large publicly held Acquiror, with the Target 
shareholders receiving marketable Acquiror stock in the 
merger.  The more compelling indication that continuity of 
interest may not exist following this type of merger is that a 
former Target shareholder’s basic role within the enterprise 
and stake in its value (represented by proportionate interest) 
may have changed significantly as a result of the merger.103 
 
101 For example, Professors Bittker and Eustice observe that “the 
merger of an independent corner grocery store into a national food chain” 
is a reorganization, even though “the local merchant who has exchanged 
his stock for the marketable stock of the surviving corporation may feel, 
quite rightly, that he has sold out.”  BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 4, 
¶ 12.01.  See also A.L.I., supra note 20, at 162. 
102 See A.L.I., supra note 20, at 162. 
103 A likely rebuttal to the arguments presented above is that they 
place too much weight on the change in the nature of Farmer Brown’s 
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C. The Escrow Rules 
In certain circumstances, Target shareholders may 
receive little or even no Acquiror stock in a transaction that 
technically satisfies the continuity of interest requirement.  
A merger agreement may contemplate merger consideration 
that consists of at least some Acquiror stock, but it may also 
require that a portion of that consideration be placed in an 
escrow account to secure a Target’s customary pre-closing 
covenants or representations and warranties.104  A Target 
may make certain representations and warranties regarding 
its business to an Acquiror through a provision in the merger 
agreement.105  The merger agreement could provide that, 
after the merger, the Acquiror will be entitled to be 
indemnified by the former shareholders of the Target for 
damages resulting from any breaches of these 
representations.  Under rules that the Treasury has recently 
enacted, Acquiror stock placed in escrow still counts toward 
satisfying the continuity of interest requirement, even 
though Target shareholders may never receive it.106 
Many members of the tax community have praised the 
new escrow rules as helpful to taxpayers engaging in real-
world transactions where such escrow mechanisms are 
 
proprietary interest.  What if Farmer Brown did not exchange his Small 
Cheesecorp stock for Big Cheesecorp stock, but instead took Small 
Cheesecorp public through an initial public offering?  Because Farmer 
Brown’s retained interest in Small Cheesecorp would likely become more 
diluted and liquid, would we argue that Farmer Brown has experienced a 
realization event as a result of a change to the nature of his investment?  
The key difference between that hypothetical and a merger qualifying as a 
reorganization is that in the merger, Farmer Brown actually exchanges 
his Small Cheesecorp stock for something completely different—Big 
Cheesecorp stock. 
104 For a thorough explanation of such escrow agreements, see Elliott 
V. Stein, Negotiating the Purchase Agreement for a Closely Held Business,  
SK065 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 441 (2005).  
105 Representations in a merger agreement may address tax, 
corporate, environmental, litigation, and other potential areas of liability 
exposure for an Acquiror. 
106 Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(e)(2)(iii)(D) (as amended in 2005).  See 
GINSBURG & LEVIN, supra note 4, ¶ 610.2. 
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commonplace.107  Few, however, have commented on the 
escrow rules’ contribution to the illusory nature of continuity 
of interest.  If the merger consideration that is earmarked for 
an escrow account in a part-cash, part-stock merger is some 
or all of the Acquiror stock, then Target shareholders may 
not receive this stock at all.  Rather, that escrowed stock 
may remain in the escrow account indefinitely (or at least for 
a very long period of time).108 
For example, returning to Big Cheesecorp’s merger with 
Small Cheesecorp, assume that instead of paying Farmer 
Brown merger consideration consisting entirely of Big 
Cheesecorp stock, the parties agree that Big Cheesecorp will 
pay Farmer Brown 400 shares of Big Cheesecorp stock 
(worth $40,000 in the aggregate) and $60,000 cash.  The 
aggregate merger consideration on its face satisfies the 
continuity of interest requirement because forty percent of it 
is Acquiror stock.  The parties agree that an escrow account 
will be created and that a portion of the merger 
consideration will be placed in this escrow account.  If Big 
Cheesecorp suffers damages after the merger because some 
of Farmer Brown’s representations in the merger agreement 
are breached, then Big Cheesecorp will be indemnified solely 
with funds from the escrow account.109  The merger 
agreement also provides that Farmer Brown will not be 
entitled to vote any of the Big Cheesecorp stock held in the 
escrow account.  Nor will any of this stock accumulate 
dividends.  The parties agree that Big Cheesecorp will be 
entitled to maximum indemnification of $30,000 from the 
 
107 The new regulation is particularly helpful in that it does not 
contain many of the requirements that the IRS previously imposed when 
issuing private letter rulings where stock of an Acquiror in a 
reorganization was deposited into an escrow account.  See Rev. Proc. 84-
42, 1984-1 C.B. 521. 
108 Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(e)(2)(iii)(D) (as amended in 2005). 
109 This mechanism may be especially attractive to Farmer Brown if 
he knows of any significant potential liability that may result from a 
breach of his representations because it caps the total amount of Farmer 
Brown’s possible indemnification at the value of the Acquiror stock 
deposited into the escrow account. 
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escrow account, so 300 shares of the Big Cheesecorp stock 
(worth $30,000) to which Farmer Brown is entitled will be 
deposited into the escrow account.  After the 300 shares of 
Big Cheesecorp stock are deposited into the escrow account, 
the merger consideration that Farmer Brown actually 
receives consists of approximately 86 percent cash and 14 
percent Big Cheesecorp stock.110  Table 2 below illustrates 
the proportions of aggregate merger consideration consisting 
of Big Cheesecorp stock that Farmer Brown would receive 
depending on whether or not an escrow account is used. 
 
Table 2.  Proportions of Merger Consideration Consisting of 
Big Cheesecorp Stock Where an Escrow Account Is Used 






Value of Cash Received  
$60,000 $60,000 
Value of Big Cheesecorp Stock 
Received 
$10,000 
(100 shares @ 
$100 per share) 
$40,000 
(400 shares @ $100 
per share) 
Proportion of Aggregate Merger 
Consideration Consisting of  Big 
Cheesecorp Stock  
14% 40% 
 
Under the Treasury’s recently enacted regulations, the 
merger in this example would satisfy the continuity of 
interest requirement and receive tax-favored reorganization 
treatment.  Even though the aggregate merger consideration 
that Farmer Brown actually receives consists of only 14 
percent Big Cheesecorp stock (rather than at least 40 
percent Big Cheesecorp stock), Farmer Brown is still deemed 
to have “continued” his proprietary interest because he 
received a “substantial” interest in Big Cheesecorp. 
The regulations provide that if the Big Cheesecorp stock 
held in escrow is eventually forfeited and returned to Big 
 
110 $10,000 worth of Big Cheesecorp stock divided by $70,000 of 
aggregate merger consideration equals approximately 14 percent Big 
Cheesecorp stock. 
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Cheesecorp, then the escrowed stock counts against the 
merger’s satisfaction of the continuity of interest 
requirement.111  However, the regulations do not require that 
Farmer Brown be entitled to vote the Big Cheesecorp stock 
held in escrow or that the Big Cheesecorp stock held in 
escrow accrue dividends paid by Big Cheesecorp on its 
stock.112  Indeed, the regulations do not require that the Big 
Cheesecorp stock held in escrow be released to Farmer 
Brown at all.113 
The escrowed stock example is another illustration of the 
continuity of interest fiction.  On paper, the merger 
agreement provides that Farmer Brown will own 400 shares 
of Big Cheesecorp stock after the merger.  In reality, Farmer 
Brown does not exercise any of the typical rights of 
ownership over the shares held in escrow.  The merger 
consideration that Farmer Brown actually receives following 
the merger consists of a very small proportion (14 percent) of 
Acquiror stock.  The regulations pretend that Farmer Brown 
owns the 300 escrowed Big Cheesecorp shares for purposes of 
testing continuity of interest even though he does not possess 
 
111 Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(e)(2)(v), ex. 2 (as amended in 2005). 
112 Id.  Prior to the issuance of these regulations, whether escrowed 
stock counted towards satisfying the continuity of interest requirement 
was a major concern of practitioners.  See N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Tax Sec., 
Treatment of Variable Stock Consideration in Tax-Free Corporate 
Reorganizations (Feb. 4, 2004), available in 102 TAX NOTES 864 (2004) 
(escrowed stock should be treated as owned by Target shareholders).  As 
the 2004 New York State Bar Association Report indicates, “The primary 
indicia of stock ownership are (1) formalities of title (although these are 
given limited weight), (2) right to dividends, (3) ability to exercise voting 
power, (4) power to dispose of the stock, (5) opportunity for gain and (6) 
risk of loss . . . .”  Id. 
113 The Big Cheesecorp stock could remain in the escrow account until 
the statute of limitations applicable to the reorganization has expired.  
After this point, the Big Cheesecorp stock in the escrow account could be 
released to Big Cheesecorp without enabling the IRS to apply the portion 
of the Treasury regulations that would cause this stock to count against 
the continuity of interest requirement.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.368-
1(e)(2)(iii)(D) (as amended in 2005). 
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any of the “primary indicia of stock ownership”114 over these 
shares. 
D. “Mere Dispositions” and Post-Reorganization 
Continuity 
If the concept of continuity of interest is that Target 
shareholders “preserve” or “continue” their proprietary 
interests following a merger by holding stock in the Acquiror, 
then post-reorganization sales of this Acquiror stock could 
rightfully be viewed as severing continuity.115  However, due 
to the burdens imposed on taxpayers, the Treasury 
effectively abolished the post-reorganization continuity of 
interest requirement in 1998.116 
The 1998 Treasury regulations have been widely praised 
by tax commentators as making the continuity of interest 
requirement workable in modern business transactions.  
Taxpayers are now able to execute mergers without worrying 
that sales by Target shareholders of Acquiror stock after a 
merger could violate the continuity of interest requirement.  
This view, however, is shortsighted.  While the new rules are 
a powerful display of administrative relief, certain aspects of 
 
114 N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Tax Section, Treatment of Variable Stock 
Consideration in Tax-Free Corporate Reorganizations (Feb. 4, 2004), 
available in 102 TAX NOTES 864 (2004). 
115 Indeed, in the “How Long” decisions, the courts held that sales of 
Acquiror stock by Target shareholders after a merger could cause the 
transaction to fail the continuity of interest requirement.  See, e.g., Heintz 
v. Comm’r, 25 T.C. 132 (1955) (holding that continuity of interest was 
severed where Target shareholders received Acquiror stock on the 
condition that they receive assistance from the Acquiror in selling that 
stock after the merger); see also McDonald’s Rest. v. Comm’r, 688 F.2d 520 
(7th Cir. 1982) (the sale of Acquiror corporation stock immediately 
following a merger and pursuant to a pre-merger plan caused the merger 
to fail the continuity of interest requirement even though the target 
shareholders were not under a binding obligation to sell). 
116 See Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(e) (as amended in 2005).  In its preamble 
to these regulations, the government stated that the regulations will 
“greatly enhance administrability in this area.”  T.D. 8760, 1998-1 C.B. 
803. 
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the rules contribute significantly to the fiction underlying 
the continuity of interest doctrine. 
The 1998 Treasury regulations provide that post-
reorganization sales of Acquiror stock by Target 
shareholders are disregarded for continuity of interest 
purposes as “mere dispositions” as long as the Target 
shareholders do not sell the stock to the Acquiror or to a 
party “related” to the Acquiror.117  Thus, immediately after a 
merger is consummated, Target shareholders may sell much 
of the Acquiror stock they received in the merger to a third 
party for cash and still receive tax-deferred treatment on the 
Acquiror stock they retain.118  This rule tests continuity of 
interest by taking a snapshot at the moment a merger closes. 
But, even this snapshot image of continuity of interest is 
illusory.  As discussed above, Target shareholders can 
dispose of the Acquiror stock that they receive immediately 
following the merger without violating continuity.  The 1998 
Treasury regulations disregard these sales even if they occur 
pursuant to a pre-existing, binding written contract.119  A 
Target shareholder can arrange to dispose of Acquiror stock 
that it will receive in a merger—even before owning it—
without impinging upon continuity of interest. 
Returning to our example, assume that Farmer Brown 
agreed to exchange his Small Cheesecorp stock for merger 
consideration consisting of $60,000 cash and 400 shares of 
Big Cheesecorp stock (worth $40,000 in the aggregate).  
Farmer Brown could sign a binding written contract, before 
the merger even closes, to transfer to a third party 300 of the 
shares that he will receive in the merger for $30,000 cash.  
 
117 See Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(e) (as amended in 2005). 
118 In fact, the 1998 Treasury regulations enable a Target shareholder 
to dispose of all of the Acquiror stock it receives immediately after a 
reorganization without infringing upon the continuity of interest 
requirement.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(e) (as amended in 2005). 
119 Id. § 1.368-1(e)(7), ex. 1 (as amended in 2006) (merger in which 
Target shareholder receives cash and Acquiror stock and, immediately 
after the merger, disposes of all of the Acquiror stock it received to a third 
party pursuant to a “preexisting binding contract” does not violate the 
continuity of interest requirement). 
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Immediately after the merger closes, therefore, Farmer 
Brown would hold a total of $90,000 cash and one hundred 
shares of Big Cheesecorp stock (worth $10,000 in the 
aggregate), meaning that a mere 10 percent of the aggregate 
consideration he receives would consist of Big Cheesecorp 
stock. 
Table 3 below illustrates the proportion of the aggregate 
merger consideration delivered to Farmer Brown that 
consists of Big Cheesecorp stock assuming that Farmer 
Brown enters into a pre-existing binding contract to sell to a 
third party and, alternatively, assuming that he does not 
enter into such a contract. 
 
Table 3.  Proportion of Merger Consideration Consisting of 
Big Cheesecorp Stock Where Farmer Brown Enters into a 
Pre-Existing Binding Contract to Sell Versus Situation 
Where No Pre-Existing Binding Contract to Sell Exists 
 
 
Does the end result here indicate that Farmer Brown 
received $90,000 in cash and $10,000 worth of Big 
Cheesecorp stock in the merger?  Although Farmer Brown 
sold most of his Big Cheesecorp stock before he even owned it, 
according to the continuity of interest doctrine (as modified 
 Assuming Pre-
Existing Binding 
Contract to Sell 
Assuming No Pre-
Existing Binding 
Contract to Sell 
Value of Cash Received 
from Big Cheesecorp 
$60,000 $60,000 
Value of Cash Received 
from Third Party 
$30,000 $0 
Value of Stock Received 
from Big Cheesecorp 
$10,000 (100 shares @ 
$100 per share) 
$40,000 (400 shares @ 
$100 per share) 
Proportion of Aggregate 
Merger Consideration 
Consisting of Big 
Cheesecorp Stock that 
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by the 1998 Treasury regulations), the answer is “no.”120  
Farmer Brown benefited from tax-deferred treatment of the 
one hundred shares of Big Cheesecorp stock that he did 
retain because he “continued” his proprietary interest 
following the merger.121 
Another aspect of the 1998 Treasury regulations that 
contributes to the continuity of interest fiction involves the 
requirement that the Target shareholders may not sell the 
Acquiror stock received in a reorganization to parties 
“related” to the Acquiror.122  This rule makes intuitive sense.  
If the Acquiror’s wholly owned subsidiary or sole shareholder 
could acquire for cash the Acquiror stock received by former 
Target shareholders in the merger, then, effectively, the 
Acquiror could deliver cash, and not stock, to those 
shareholders.123 
A major inconsistency in these rules, however, is that 
only a corporation can technically qualify as a “related 
person.”124  If an individual, rather than a corporation, owns 
100 percent of an Acquiror, this individual shareholder is not 
considered to be a person “related” to the Acquiror.125  
Consequently, in a statutory merger, an Acquiror that is 
 
120 See id. 
121 If the continuity of interest doctrine viewed Farmer Brown as 
receiving $90,000 in cash and $10,000 worth of Big Cheesecorp stock, then 
Farmer Brown would realize a taxable gain equal to the difference 
between the full $100,000 of merger consideration and his adjusted basis 
in his Small Cheesecorp stock.  Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(a) (1996). 
122 Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(e)(7), ex. 1 (as amended in 2005). 
123 An Acquiror’s wholly owned corporate subsidiary qualifies as a 
“related person” to the Acquiror.  Id. § 1.368-1(e)(4).  It is logically 
consistent that this rule would also apply to shareholders in control of the 
Acquiror. 
124  Id. § 1.368-1(e)(4)(i).  Generally, a person is related to the Acquiror 
under these regulations if either (A) the two corporations are members of 
the same affiliated group, as defined in I.R.C. § 1504 (2005) (without 
regard to I.R.C. § 1504(b)) (2005) or (B) (2005) the purchase of stock by one 
corporation would be treated as a distribution in redemption of stock of the 
first corporation under § 304(a)(2) (without regard to Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-
80(b) (2005)). 
125 Id. 
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wholly-owned by an individual shareholder can agree to 
deliver aggregate merger consideration consisting of $60,000 
cash and 400 Acquiror shares (worth $40,000 in the 
aggregate) to Target shareholders in exchange for their 
Target stock; prior to the consummation of the merger, the 
individual sole shareholder of the Acquiror can also make an 
agreement with the Target shareholders to repurchase 300 of 
the Acquiror shares for $30,000 cash immediately after the 
merger closes.  Even though the Target shareholders in such 
a transaction only receive merger consideration consisting of 
10 percent Acquiror stock, because the Target shareholders 
agree to sell a portion of their Acquiror stock to a person that 
is “unrelated” to the Acquiror (the individual sole 
shareholder), the continuity of interest requirement is 
satisfied.126 
Despite the rule restricting an Acquiror’s post-
reorganization repurchase of its stock for cash from Target 
shareholders, there are also certain instances in which an 
Acquiror can repurchase for cash the very Acquiror shares 
that it delivered to Target shareholders in a reorganization 
without adversely implicating continuity of interest.  In 
Revenue Ruling 99-58,127 the IRS ruled that an Acquiror’s 
post-reorganization stock repurchases did not infringe upon 
continuity of interest where the Acquiror repurchased these 
shares to “prevent dilution resulting from the issuance of 
[Acquiror] shares in the merger” pursuant to a pre-existing 
stock repurchase program.128 
This ruling, however, enables Acquirors to establish a 
vehicle by which to provide cash directly to Target 
shareholders in exchange for their interests in the 
 
126 Id. § 1.368-1(e)(7), ex. 1. 
127 Rev. Rul. 99-58, 1999-2 C.B. 701. 
128 Id.  Several commentators have noted the significance of Rev. Rul. 
99-58 in that it directly contradicts Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(e) (as amended in 
2005).  See, e.g., Joseph Calianno, The Impact of Stock Repurchase 
Programs on Corporate Reorganizations, 2 BUS. ENTITIES 12, 16 (2000) 
(“[This Ruling] deviates from the example in the Regulations in that there 
is a direct modification of the issuing corporation’s stock repurchase 
program caused by the reorganization”). 
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Acquiror.129  Indeed, in the ruling the Acquiror “modified” its 
stock repurchase program to enable it to acquire “a number 
of its shares equal to the number issued in the acquisition of 
[Target].”130  An Acquiror may publicly announce its plans to 
institute a stock repurchase program after the merger is 
consummated.131  Even with such a program in place, 
satisfaction of the continuity of interest requirement is not 
threatened, and participating shareholders will not be taxed 
on the Acquiror stock that they do not sell back to the 
Acquiror. 
The 1998 regulations and Revenue Ruling 99-58 have 
been lauded as positive developments.132  But, because they 
enable parties to satisfy the continuity of interest doctrine 
even when Target shareholders ultimately retain little 
Acquiror stock, they highlight how the doctrine, as applied 
today, fails to achieve its intended purpose. 
E. Fictional Equity 
The continuity of interest doctrine requires that 
shareholders of a Target receive a substantial, material, and 
definite interest in the Acquiror.133  The doctrine, however, 
merely requires that Target shareholders in a reorganization 
receive an instrument from the Acquiror bearing the label 
 
129 Taxpayers have also observed that Rev. Rul. 99-58 does not set any 
parameters regarding the amount of Acquiror stock that may be 
repurchased without compromising continuity.  See, e.g., Mark J. 
Silverman, Current Developments in Tax-Free Corporate Reorganizations, 
SK028 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 2751, 2813 (2004) (“[i]t is unclear to what extent the 
size of the repurchase matters.  Query whether . . . [Acquiror] may, for 
example, repurchase 90 percent of its stock in a stock repurchase 
program”). 
130 Id. at 2812. 
131 There are a number of ways in which an Acquiror can inform the 
Target shareholders of the share repurchase program, including through 
public press releases or proxy statements. 
132 See, e.g., Calianno, supra note 128, at 14. 
133 See Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(e) (as amended in 2005); Helvering v. 
Minn. Tea Co., 296 U.S. 378, 386 (1935); Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. 
Comm’r, 287 U.S. 462, 471 (1933). 
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“equity,” no matter how tenuous the equity characteristics of 
this instrument.134 
Almost any type of Acquiror stock—even preferred 
stock—will serve as valid consideration for continuity of 
interest purposes.135  Preferred stock—as opposed to common 
stock—holders generally receive a fixed dividend from an 
Acquiror and do not participate in the potential economic 
growth of the Acquiror.136 
The courts and the IRS have ruled that Target 
shareholders may qualify as holding a sufficient continuing 
interest in the Acquiror where they receive merger 
consideration consisting of cash and non-voting preferred 
stock of the Acquiror that is redeemable for cash by the 
Acquiror at any time.137  Thus, if Farmer Brown exchanged 
his Small Cheesecorp common stock for mandatorily 
redeemable, non-voting preferred stock in Big Cheesecorp, he 
would be deemed to have received a definite, material, and 
substantial proprietary interest that would satisfy 
continuity.  In reality, the interest that Farmer Brown 
receives in Big Cheesecorp is significantly less equity-like 
than the common stock he held in Small Cheesecorp. 
The tax law even treats so-called “non-qualified preferred 
stock” as a sufficient equity interest in the Acquiror when it 
 
134 See Rev. Rul. 78-142, 1978-1 C.B. 111.  See also Schweitzer & 
Conrad, Inc. v. Comm’r, 41 B.T.A. 533, 542 (1940). 
135 See John A. Nelson Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 374, 378 (1935) 
(Target shareholders’ receipt of merger consideration, 38.5 percent of 
which consisted of non-voting preferred Acquiror stock, satisfied the 
continuity of interest requirement.). 
136 19 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 2:56 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 2004). 
137 Schweitzer & Conrad, Inc., 41 B.T.A. at 550 (continuity of interest 
was satisfied where one corporation acquired all of the assets of another in 
exchange for preferred stock and cash, even though the preferred stock 
could be redeemed at any time on 30 days notice at par plus accumulated 
and unpaid dividends, and where the parties took steps within two months 
of the merger to redeem a substantial portion of this stock); Rev. Rul. 78-
142, 1978-1 C.B. 111 (mandatorily redeemable preferred stock provides 
sufficient continuity of interest). 
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comes to testing continuity of interest.138  Congress has 
considered this type of stock to be so similar to debt that 
when Target shareholders receive it in a merger, they are 
taxed on it.139  Yet despite this designation, the tax law 
respects non-qualified preferred stock as stock in 
determining whether Target shareholders have continued 
their interest in the Acquiror.140 
The contrast between the continuity of interest doctrine’s 
treatment of “fictional” equity (i.e., non-voting, mandatorily 
redeemable preferred stock) of the Acquiror and its 
treatment of long-term debt of the Acquiror is striking.  The 
courts have held that 100-year bonds of an Acquiror do not 
provide sufficient continuity.141  Receipt of these types of debt 
interests probably compels former Target shareholders to 
maintain an even more significant continuing interest in the 
assets of the former Target than if the former Target 
shareholders had received stock.  But because 100-year 
bonds do not bear the required “stock” label, they are not 
considered to provide former Target shareholders with a 
sufficient continuing interest in the Acquiror.142 
The obsessive focus of the continuity of interest doctrine 
on “equity” as the only viable form of proprietary interest in 
 
138 See TREASURY BLUE BOOK 213 (1997) (nonqualified preferred stock 
will be respected for continuity of interest purposes “unless and until 
Treasury regulations are issued requiring a different result”).  See also 
GINSBURG & LEVIN, supra note 4, ¶ 610.1.1, n.26 (“Treasury’s extensive 
regulatory authority under [this Section] presumably could be exercised to 
declare all [nonqualified preferred stock] bad consideration (‘not stock’) in 
testing [continuity of interest], but nothing suggests that Treasury is 
likely to do anything of the sort.”). 
139 I.R.C. § 356(e) (2005); Treas. Reg. § 1.356-6(a) (as amended in 
2000) (nonqualified preferred stock treated as boot at shareholder level). 
140 See TREASURY BLUE BOOK, supra note 138, at 213. 
141 Roebling v. Comm’r, 143 F.2d 810, 813-14 (3d Cir. 1944) (Target 
shareholder’s exchange of stock in Target for Acquiror’s 100-year bonds 
with a fixed 8 percent return pursuant to a merger did not satisfy 
continuity of interest requirement, even though Target shareholder’s 
economic position did not change significantly.). 
142 Id.  See also Le Tulle v. Scofield, 308 U.S. 415, 421-22 (1940) (long-
term debt does not create holders of “proprietary interest”). 
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the Acquiror adds to the fiction.  In many cases, the Acquiror 
stock that Target shareholders receive in a reorganization 
does not contain concrete equity-like characteristics.  In 
almost every other aspect of the tax law, whether an 
instrument represents equity or not is a difficult and 
important question.143  The continuity of interest doctrine, on 
the other hand, does not adopt such a nuanced approach. 
F. A Meaningless Tradition 
This Part has demonstrated that the continuity of 
interest doctrine fails to achieve its intended purpose.  
Although the doctrine attempts to ensure that a substantial 
number of former Target shareholders continue to own an 
interest in the Acquiror following a reorganization, this 
objective is often unfulfilled.  At the most basic level, it is 
very difficult to argue that, in many  reorganizations, Target 
shareholders receive or retain interests in the Acquiror that 
could be described as a substantive “continuation” of their 
interests in the Target. 
The continuity of interest fiction is the product of 
misguided judicial intervention coupled with administrative 
relief.  Soon after the birth of Congress’s reorganization 
provisions, judges, not Congress, decided that continued 
Target shareholder ownership following a merger was a 
characteristic trait of a merger that was a mere change in 
 
143 For example, if a corporation issues an instrument that is 
respected as debt, then payments by the corporation with respect to that 
instrument may be deductible interest payments instead of non-deductible 
dividend payments.  For fine works addressing the debt/equity question in 
other contexts, see Adam O. Emmerich, Hybrid Instruments and the Debt-
Equity Distinction in Corporate Taxation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 118 (1985); 
Louis S. Freeman & Richard M. Lipton, Tax Consequences of Business and 
Investment-Driven Uses of Derivatives, 72 TAXES 947 (1994); David P. 
Hariton, Distinguishing Between Equity and Debt in the New Financial 
Environment, 49 TAX L. REV. 499 (1994); William Plumb, The Federal 
Income Tax Significance of Corporate Debt: A Critical Analysis and a 
Proposal, 26 TAX L. REV. 369 (1971); Anthony P. Polito, Useful Fictions: 
Debt and Equity Classification in Corporate Tax Law, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 761 
(1998). 
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form.144  Without acknowledging the questionable nature of 
this premise, the Treasury, the IRS, and the courts created 
so many requirements to comply with this judicial ideal that 
the doctrine became onerous and impractical.  Over the past 
ten years, the Treasury and the IRS have, in effect, conceded 
that the doctrine is not viable by significantly liberalizing its 
requirements.145  This relief has contributed to the fiction 
and has lead to the doctrine’s persistence today as a 
meaningless tradition that the tax law continues to observe 
with “religious-like obeisance.”146 
The continuity of interest doctrine fails to distinguish 
between a special merger deserving of reorganization status 
and one that is an ordinary sale.  The continued ownership 
by former Target shareholders following a merger that 
qualifies as a reorganization looks very similar to that by 
former Target shareholders following a taxable merger.  
Because the doctrine does not adequately serve as a means 
for determining what types of mergers ought to receive 
Congress’s special tax treatment, a new approach is needed. 
V. THE END OF CONTINUITY: A NEW APPROACH 
The continuity of interest doctrine is fundamentally and 
practically flawed.  Instead of refining the continuity of 
interest rules further, we should consider an alternative way 
to determine whether a merger will enjoy tax-favored 
treatment. 
Any replacement for the continuity of interest doctrine 
should consider the significance of the reorganization 
provisions of the Code in the context of the realization rule.  
A fundamental principle underlying our tax system is that 
 
144 See supra Part II for further discussion of the judicial development 
of the doctrine. 
145 Indeed, when the Treasury issued the 1998 regulations, it stated 
explicitly that the purpose of these regulations was to quell taxpayer 
uncertainty regarding satisfaction of the minimum Acquiror stock 
threshold.  T.D. 8760, 1998-1 C.B. 803.   See also Rev. Rul. 99-58, 1999-52 
I.R.B. 701; Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(e)(2) (as amended in 2005). 
146 Wolfman, supra note 4. 
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without a realization event, no income arises that can be the 
subject of current taxation.147  With very few exceptions, the 
taxpayer experiences a realization event only when he 
exchanges his investment for something “materially 
different” (or when the taxpayer is deemed to have done 
so).148 
Mergers that qualify as reorganizations under current 
law are an exception to the realization rule.  This exception 
is remarkable, especially in light of the sheer dollar value of 
tax revenue at stake in many mergers and that in a 
reorganization, corporate- and shareholder-level taxes are 
not imposed.  Congress’s oft-stated rationale for the 
exception is that certain mergers represent mere 
readjustments—“purely paper transactions” and “mere 
changes in form”149—rather than ordinary sales transactions. 
An effective set of rules should deliver tax-favored 
treatment to mergers that appear to be mere changes in 
corporate form and where shareholders experience purely 
paper transactions.  Thus, the key task is identifying the 
distinguishing characteristics of these special mergers.  This 
Article’s Proposal asserts that the corporate- and 
shareholder-level characteristics described below should be 
present in a merger in order for a Target and its 
shareholders to enjoy an exemption from the realization rule. 
First, the Proposal emphasizes that the fundamental 
corporate-level trait of a merger that is a mere change in 
form is that the Acquiror continues the historic business of 
the Target in a real and meaningful way.  Unlike current law 
or past proposed alternatives, the Proposal offers strict rules 
mandating that the Acquiror conduct the Target’s historic 
business for at least a set amount of time after a merger.  
Further, the Proposal places other restrictions on the 
 
147 Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(a) (1996).  For a description and discussion 
of the realization rule, see Schenk, supra note 58. 
148 See Cottage Sav. Ass’n v. Comm’r, 499 U.S. 554 (1991) (exchange of 
property triggers realization event when exchanged properties are 
“materially different”). 
149  H.R. REP. NO. 68-179, at 16 (1924); S. REP. NO. 68-398, at 17-18 
(1924); S. REP. NO. 65-617, pt. 1, at 5 (1918). 
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Acquiror’s post-merger conduct of a Target’s historic 
business and specific uses of a Target’s historic business 
assets.  Whether a merger should be treated as an ordinary 
sale or as a special transaction, therefore, should depend on 
the extent to which the Acquiror continues the historic 
business of the Target following a merger. 
Second, the Proposal contains a set of shareholder-level 
requirements intended to exempt Target shareholders from 
the realization rule where they engage in a purely paper 
transaction by exchanging Target stock for Acquiror stock.  
In a major departure from both current law and past 
proposed alternatives, the Proposal considers whether a 
Target shareholder’s voting rights and percentage interest in 
the enterprise have changed dramatically as a result of a 
merger. 
The Proposal represents a new alternative to the 
continuity of interest doctrine.  Where the continuity of 
interest doctrine serves a fictitious premise, the Proposal 
restores some sense of truth to the mere-change-in-form and 
purely-paper-transaction depictions. 
Before continuing further, one caveat is necessary.  
Neither the Proposal nor the rest of this Article address the 
broader normative question of whether we should continue 
Congress’s special tax treatment of certain mergers.  Rather, 
the Proposal is intended to present a more effective and 
rational approach to how we administer this special 
treatment. 
A. Past Proposed Alternatives 
Attempts to replace the continuity of interest doctrine are 
not a new phenomenon.  Before examining the specific terms 
of the Proposal, it is helpful to review the alternatives that 
have been offered in the past. 
The most well-known proposal to replace the continuity of 
interest doctrine was presented by the American Law 
Institute (“A.L.I.”) in its multi-year study, Federal Income 
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Tax Project, Subchapter C,150 which was completed in 1980 
(the “A.L.I. Report”).  The A.L.I. Report was so influential 
that the Senate Finance Committee eventually adopted 
significant elements of its proposal in 1985 (although the 
proposed legislation was not enacted).151 
The A.L.I. Report proposed a bifurcation of the tax 
treatment of corporate mergers: 
At the corporate level, the tax treatment of a merger of a 
Target into an Acquiror would be expressly elective by the 
taxpayer.152  If an Acquiror in a statutory merger desired 
taxable treatment, it would simply make an election to treat 
the merger as a taxable sale of assets by the Target to the 
Acquiror by filing a form with the IRS.  The Acquiror would 
then assume a cost basis in the Target’s assets.153  If, on the 
other hand, an Acquiror desired tax-deferred, carryover basis 
treatment, it would make no election following the merger.154 
Shareholder-level consequences in a merger, under the 
A.L.I. Report’s proposal, would be completely independent of 
the corporate-level election.  If a Target shareholder received 
any amount of Acquiror stock in exchange for its Target 
stock, the shareholder would recognize no gain on that 
stock.155 
 
150 See generally A.L.I., supra note 20. 
151 See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FINANCE, 99TH CONG., FINAL REPORT ON 
THE SUBCHAPTER C REVISION ACT OF 1985 (Comm. Print 1985). 
152 See A.L.I., supra note 20, at 145 (Proposal C4). 
153 See id. (“[A]ny acquisition of assets by statutory merger or 
consolidation, if the surviving corporation shall so elect, shall be treated as 
if the acquired corporation had transferred its assets and distributed the 
proceeds in liquidation to its shareholders, and the acquired corporation or 
surviving corporation shall then be liable for all its income taxes including 
those resulting from the imputed asset transfer; and the acquired 
corporation’s assets shall then have a fresh cost basis in the hands of the 
acquired corporation or the surviving corporation, as the case may be.”). 
154 See id. at 73 (carryover basis default treatment for statutory 
mergers). 
155 See id. at 167 (Proposal D1) (“No gain or loss shall be recognized by 
any noncorporate shareholder if stock of an acquired corporation is, in 
pursuance of a plan of acquisition, exchanged solely for stock of one or 
more acquiring corporations.”). 
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Even twenty-five years after its publication, the A.L.I. 
Report’s proposed alternative to the continuity of interest 
doctrine has not been subject to serious challenge.156  In 
describing the merits of the Proposal below, this Part will 
contrast the Proposal’s ability to distinguish between 
ordinary sales and special mergers with that of the A.L.I. 
Report.  This Part contends that the A.L.I. Report does not 
achieve this objective, but instead opts to achieve a regime of 
simplicity. 
B. A New Approach 
The Proposal presented in this Article diverges from both 
current law and the alternative offered by the A.L.I. Report.  
Its primary objective is to administer tax-favored treatment 
to mergers where the Target’s historic business is preserved 
and a Target shareholder’s role within the enterprise does 
not change significantly as a result of the merger.  In 
contrast to the continuity of interest doctrine, the Proposal 
serves these policy goals.157 
1. The Proposal 
The Proposal advances two sets of rules that address the 
corporate- and shareholder-level tax treatment of a merger.  
These rules are presented separately below: 
 
Qualifying Merger.  The first part of the Proposal is 
that where (a) a Target merges into an Acquiror in a 
statutory merger,158 transferring substantially all of its 
assets to the Acquiror, and (b) for the two-year period 
 
156 See, e.g., Wolfman, supra note 4 (“But for general theme and 
scheme you have it all—by my lights, elegant and sensible as well as 
simple and short.”); but see George Yin, A Carryover Basis Asset 
Acquisition Regime: A Few Words of Caution, 37 TAX NOTES 415 (1987). 
157 The A.L.I. Report also ignores these principles in an effort to serve 
administrative convenience. 
158 For purposes of determining what constitutes a “statutory merger,” 
this proposal would retain the definition under the current reorganization 
provisions.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(b)(1)(ii) (as amended in 2005). 
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immediately following the merger, the Acquiror (i) continues 
the historic business of the Target directly or (ii) uses a 
substantial portion of the assets of the Target in a business 
of the Acquiror that is of “like kind” to the Target’s historic 
business, the merger will be treated as a “qualifying 
merger.”159  The Target will not recognize taxable gain or loss 
on its transfer of assets in a qualifying merger.160  The 
Acquiror will hold any assets it receives from the Target as a 
result of a qualifying merger with the Target’s basis (i.e., a 
“carryover basis”) in the assets.161 
 
Shareholder Non-Recognition.  The second part of the 
Proposal is that, as a default rule, a Target shareholder will 
not recognize gain or loss on the exchange of any Target 
stock for stock of an Acquiror that is a party to a qualifying 
merger with the Target. 
However, there are two exceptions to this default rule.  
First, to the extent that a Target shareholder exchanges any 
voting stock for non-voting stock, or vice versa, the exchange 
will be taxable.162  Second, if, immediately after the merger, 
 
159 This provision is intended to replace the concept of a reorganization 
under I.R.C. §§ 368(a)(1)(A) and (a)(2)(D) (2005) in the case of forward 
mergers of the Target into the Acquiror or its subsidiary. 
160 Accordingly, if a merger fails the qualifying merger requirements, 
the transaction will be treated as a taxable sale of assets by the Target to 
the Acquiror. 
161 The term “carryover basis” generally means that the Acquiror will 
hold the former Target’s assets with a basis equal to the basis of the assets 
in the hands of the former Target, increased by any gain recognized by the 
Target on the transfer.  The relevant provisions of the Code dealing with 
carryover basis treatment in a reorganization under current law can be 
found in I.R.C. § 362 (2005). 
162 The Proposal would not, however, repeal or otherwise implicate the 
treatment of “non-qualified preferred stock” under current law.  Under 
I.R.C. § 351(g) (2005), stock that resembles debt and is reasonably likely to 
be redeemed is treated as boot.  This rule applies under current law 
irrespective of whether a Target shareholder exchanges voting or non-
voting Target stock for Acquiror stock that is non-qualified preferred 
stock.  Congress enacted this rule to preserve the debt-equity distinction.  
Because that policy objective differs from that of the Proposal, the non-
qualified preferred stock rules should continue to be applied. 
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the former Target shareholder’s percentage interest in the 
Acquiror (measured by either vote or value) is less than 20 
percent of the former Target shareholder’s percentage 
interest in the Target (measured by either vote or value) 
immediately prior to the merger, then the Target 
shareholder’s exchange of any Target stock for Acquiror 
stock will be taxable.163  In either case, if, in addition to the 
Acquiror stock received in the merger, a Target shareholder 
receives any cash or any property other than stock, then the 
shareholder will recognize gain solely with respect to the 
cash or other property received to the extent of the 
shareholder’s realized gain.164  A Target shareholder’s basis 
in Acquiror stock received pursuant to a qualifying merger 
will be the same as the shareholder’s basis in the Target 
stock he relinquished (decreased by the fair market value of 
any non-stock property received and increased by any gain 
that the Target shareholder recognizes).165 
2. Explanation of Corporate-Level Requirements 
The “qualifying merger” requirements of the Proposal are 
intended to ensure that special tax treatment is applied to 
mergers where the Target could be described as undergoing 
a mere change in corporate form. 
 
163 The Proposal does not simply look to decreases in the amount of 
stock that a particular Target shareholder holds after a merger.  Rather, 
the Proposal considers decreases in the Target shareholder’s percentage 
interest in the Acquiror from the Target shareholder’s percentage interest 
in the Target. 
164 The Proposal would also generally retain the reorganization 
provisions’ treatment of boot received by Target shareholders under 
current law.  See I.R.C. § 356(a)(1) (2005) (“If (A) section 354 or 355 would 
apply to an exchange but for the fact that (B) the property received in the 
exchange consists not only of property permitted by section 354 or 355 to 
be received without the recognition of gain but also of other property or 
money, then the gain, if any, to the recipient shall be recognized, but in an 
amount not in excess of the sum of such money and the fair market value 
of such other property.”). 
165 The Proposal thus adopts the “substituted basis” rules that exist 
under current law.  See I.R.C. § 358(a)(1) (2005). 
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a. Identifying Mere Changes in Form 
The Proposal grants tax-favored treatment to mergers 
where the historic business of the Target survives the 
merger, even though the Target, as a corporate entity, does 
not.  Unlike current law, the Proposal disregards the type 
and composition of merger consideration that an Acquiror 
delivers to Target shareholders.166  A merger receives tax-
favored treatment under the Proposal if substantially all of 
the Target’s assets are transferred to the Acquiror in the 
merger167, and the Acquiror continues the Target’s historic 
business for at least two years following the merger.168  
During this two-year period, the Acquiror may fulfill the 
Proposal’s historic business requirement by operating the 
Target’s historic business directly or, alternatively, by using 
substantially all of the Target’s assets in a business of the 
 
166 The continuity of interest requirement causes a merger to be 
wholly taxable if merger consideration that consists of less than the 
required aggregate amount of Acquiror stock is paid to Target 
shareholders.  Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(e) (as amended in 2005). 
167 The Proposal’s requirement that a Target transfer “substantially 
all” of its assets to an Acquiror is intended to prevent taxpayers from 
achieving tax-deferral with respect to inherently divisive transactions.  
Without such a requirement, a Target could dispose of a large amount of 
its assets to a third party and then merge into an Acquiror in a “qualifying 
merger,” which would not result in current taxation under the Proposal.  
The “substantially all” requirement prevents this result. 
168 The two-year period used in the Proposal is intended to represent a 
substantial amount of time.  The choice of this amount of time is purely 
arbitrary.  Other sections of the Code, however, also utilize a two-year 
period to monitor post-transaction activity.  See, e.g., I.R.C. § 355(e) (2005). 
It is possible that the required time frame could be longer or shorter than 
two years, but, in the world of tax law, two years is almost an eternity.  
Under the “step-transaction doctrine,” courts, the IRS, and taxpayers may 
integrate the steps of a transaction to achieve a tax result that would not 
be possible if each step was analyzed independently.  A common factor 
underlying many cases where the step-transaction doctrine was invoked 
involved transactions where a series of steps occurred in close proximity to 
each other.  See, e.g., Murrin v. Comm’r, 24 T.C. 502, 508 (1955) (“All of 
the transactions occurred in one day and the first would not have 
happened without a view to the last, for each of the several steps was in 
pursuance of a previously agreed upon plan.”). 
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Acquiror that is of “like kind” to the Target’s historic 
business. 
Why does the Proposal so heavily emphasize continuation 
of the Target’s historic business in administering tax-favored 
treatment?  The reason is that the identity of the Target is 
inextricably linked to the business that it conducts.169 
For example, consider McDonald’s Corporation.  This 
corporate entity is known around the globe as an operator of 
“fast-food” restaurants, and it prominently displays the 
“golden arches” that are synonymous with its business as its 
corporate logo.170  Consumers associate McDonald’s 
Corporation with “Happy Meals” and other products of its 
fast-food business.171  The investing public purchases 
McDonald’s Corporation stock based on the earnings forecast 
of its fast-food business (and the restaurant industry at 
large).172  Moreover, lenders decide to make loans to 
McDonald’s Corporation only after reviewing the 
performance of McDonald’s Corporation’s business activity.173  
When deciding whether to interact with McDonald’s 
Corporation, these consumers, investors, and lenders all 
consider the business of McDonald’s Corporation before 
 
169 The question of whether a corporation should be treated as a 
separate person with a separate personality is age-old.  See, e.g., Arthur 
W. Machen, Jr., Corporate Personality, 24 HARV. L. REV. 253 (1911) 
(describing the corporate entity as a being separate from its owners as a 
result of its unique characteristics); Gregory A. Mark, The Personification 
of the Business Corporation in American Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1441 
(1987).  One of the fundamental distinguishing characteristics of a 
corporation’s identity is its primary business activity. 
170 Not surprisingly, the logo does not contain a single image of the 
corporation’s largest shareholder.  See McDonald’s, http://www. 
mcdonalds.com (last visited Dec. 4, 2005).  Dodge & Cox, Inc., McDonald’s 
Corporation’s largest shareholder as of December 21, 2005 (holding 5.54 
percent according to a Thomson Financial Security Report), does not 
appear in any readily accessible McDonald’s Corporation promotional 
material. 
171 See McDonald’s Corporation, Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Mar. 4, 
2005). 
172 See id. 
173 See id. 
BLANK_FINAL.DOC 2/28/2006  10:39:53 PM 
54 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2006 
considering its shareholders.  The unique business activity of 
a corporation is its central defining characteristic. 
After a merger of a Target into an Acquiror, the Target 
can be described as continuing to exist, in substance, if the 
Acquiror continues the Target’s historic business in a real 
and meaningful way.  The Proposal rejects the excessive 
focus of current law on continued ownership by a Target’s 
shareholders after a merger for purposes of determining 
whether the Target has changed.  For the many reasons 
discussed in Part IV, in practice, continued ownership often 
does not exist or is illusory at best.  The Proposal refocuses 
the rules squarely on the question of whether a Target’s 
historic business, not its historic shareholder base, 
continues.  While current law contains rules regarding an 
Acquiror’s continuation of the historic business of the Target 
in a reorganization,174 those rules are extremely flexible and 
easy to satisfy.175 
The two-year requirement of the Proposal is an effective 
means for distinguishing between mergers that are mere 
changes in form and those that are ordinary sales.  In an 
ordinary sale, a financial investor may acquire the assets of 
a Target via merger and shortly thereafter, sell the assets to 
third-party buyers for cash.  Private equity funds, for 
example, frequently acquire assets through mergers using a 
corporate subsidiary and then quickly “flip” the assets by 
selling off the pieces for cash.176  On the other hand, an 
Acquiror that truly desires to conduct the Target’s historic 
business may acquire the Target via merger and then 
continue the Target’s historic business for a number of years.  
The Proposal distinguishes between these two types of 
transactions by mandating that an Acquiror conduct the 
 
174 Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(d)(1) (as amended in 2006) (“Continuity of 
business enterprise (COBE) requires that the issuing corporation (P) . . . 
either continue the target corporation’s (T’s) historic business or use a 
significant portion of T’s historic business assets in a business.”). 
175 See id.; see also BLOCK, supra note 43, at 347. 
176 See Paul S. Bird, Private Equity M&A: Current Topics, 1339 
PLI/CORP 11 (2002) (describing various exit strategies that private equity 
funds often utilize). 
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historic business of the Target for at least two years 
following the merger in order to receive tax-favored 
treatment.  Current law, by comparison, does not contain 
any explicit rule regarding the amount of time that an 
Acquiror must continue a Target’s historic business.177 
The Proposal’s rule that an Acquiror may satisfy the 
historic business test during this two-year period by directly 
conducting the Target’s business adds credibility to the 
mere-change-in-form construct.  When an Acquiror continues 
the Target’s historic business directly, the business, with all 
its unique attributes, survives the merger.178  In this case, 
the corporate entity encapsulating the Target’s historic 
business is the only real corporate-level alteration in such a 
merger.  Consequently, a mere change in the Target’s form 
can be said to have occurred. 
The Proposal’s alternative rule, that an Acquiror may use 
substantially all of the assets of the Target in a business that 
is of “like kind” to the Target’s historic business, is essential 
to the mere change-in-form construct.179  Returning to an 
example from Part IV, under current law, a merger of Small 
Cheesecorp (which produces cheese as its primary business) 
into Acme Purse Company (which produces women’s leather 
products as its primary business) qualifies for tax-favored 
treatment even when Acme Purse Company uses the cattle 
assets of Small Cheesecorp to expand its leather product 
business.  In this type of merger, where the Acquiror utilizes 
the Target’s assets in a business that is completely different 
than that of the Target, it is difficult to argue that a mere 
change in the Target’s corporate form is all that has 
 
177 Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(d)(1) (as amended in 2005). 
178 Regulatory guidance would be needed to address mergers where a 
Target corporation conducts more than one line of business.  Such 
guidance could provide that an Acquiror should only be required to 
conduct the most significant line of business of the Target following a 
merger. 
179 The concept of a “like kind exchange” that is exempted from the 
realization requirement already exists in other provisions of the Code that 
provide instructive guidance for the Proposal.  See I.R.C. § 1031 (2005). 
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occurred.180  The “like kind” business requirement of the 
Proposal avoids this fiction.  Although exactly what types of 
businesses would qualify as “like kind” is not intuitively 
apparent, businesses that are part of the same industry and 
produce similar products generally should be considered 
“like kind.”181  Regulatory guidance would be necessary to 
explain in more concrete terms what types of businesses 
would qualify as “like kind.”182 
b. Contrasts with the A.L.I. Report 
The A.L.I. Report differs significantly from the Proposal 
in considering the extent to which a Target’s historic 
business continues following a merger.  The A.L.I. Report 
presents a detailed critique of the continuity of interest 
doctrine and argues for its repeal.183  However, without 
similarly detailed explanation or analysis, the A.L.I. Report 
rejects the concept of the continuity of business enterprise 
requirement as well.184  Under the alternative offered in the 
A.L.I. Report, the Acquiror may use the Target’s business 
assets for any purpose.  The A.L.I. Report’s alternative would 
even allow the Acquiror to cease the Target’s historic 
business altogether after the merger and sell off a portion of 
 
180 An Acquiror is only required under current law to use a significant 
portion of a Target’s historic business assets in “a” business.  Treas. Reg. § 
1.368-1(d)(i) (as amended in 2005).  This lack of specificity means that the 
Acquiror can use the Target’s business assets in any type of business it 
chooses, as long as the business is “a” business of the Acquiror. 
181 The rules of I.R.C. § 1031 (2005), of course, would serve as a critical 
foundation for determining what types of businesses would qualify as “like 
kind.”  Regulations underlying § 1031 provide that an exchange of a 
copyright on a novel for a copyright on a song does not constitute a like 
kind exchange.  Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-2(c)(3), exs. 1 and 2 (as amended in 
2002).  Likewise, a cheese production business and a leather purse 
production business should not be considered like kind. 
182 See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-1, 2 (as amended in 2002). 
183 See A.L.I., supra note 20, at 165. 
184 The A.L.I. Report comments that “while it would be possible to 
impose a continuity-of-business-enterprise requirement without a 
continuity of interest requirement, many of the reasons for dispensing 
with the latter would also seem to apply to the former.”  Id. at 162. 
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the Target’s business assets for cash.185  Thus, the A.L.I. 
Report implicitly suggests that the benefit of tax deferral 
should be bestowed upon mergers that represent complete 
transformations of the Target. 
The A.L.I. Report’s express election mechanism also fails 
to consider any special characteristics of a merger before 
conferring tax-favored treatment upon the merger.186  Under 
the A.L.I. Report, the tax treatment of a merger does not 
hinge on the Acquiror’s continuation of the Target’s historic 
business (as it does under the Proposal) or on any other 
special factors.  Rather, the tax treatment is merely the 
result of an Acquiror’s decision to file an IRS form classifying 
the merger as tax-deferred or taxable.187 
The A.L.I. Report’s election mechanism also could cut 
against the government disproportionately and lead to 
unintended abuse.  The government has learned from recent 
experience that taxpayer elections may be detrimental to its 
interests and, at the same time, unfairly advantageous to the 
taxpayer.  For example, the use of “check-the-box elections” 
by foreign business entities has forced the government to 
spend the last several years combating taxpayer abuse.188  
 
185 See id. at 73. 
186 See id. 
187 See id. at 41 (“The solution to the trouble is to make tax 
classification explicitly elective and as independent as possible of 
corporate procedural considerations.”). 
188  The “check-the-box elections” allow taxpayers to elect the legal 
status of an entity for tax purposes.  Commentators have observed that 
the use of the check-the-box election regulations in the international 
context has resulted in taxpayer-favorable consequences that the Treasury 
did not intend.  See Jeffrey L. Rubinger, Tax Court Upholds ‘Check and 
Sell’ Strategy to Avoid Subpart F Income: Has Pandora’s Box Been Opened, 
THE M&A TAX REPORT, VOL. 13:2 (2004) (“Since the final check-the-box 
Regulations were issued in December of 1996, taxpayers have been 
devising strategies to exploit them in ways that the drafters probably 
never intended.”).  Most recently, taxpayers have successfully utilized the 
check-the-box regulations to avoid inclusions of “Subpart F income.”  See 
Dover Corporation, 122 T.C. No. 19 (2005) (check-the-box election of a 
lower-tier subsidiary filed just before the sale of its stock by its parent, a 
controlled foreign corporation, characterized as a disposition of assets used 
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Similarly, the taxpayer election for safe harbor leasing, 
which was introduced in the 1980s, led to such significant 
taxpayer abuse that Congress eventually repealed the 
provision.189 
This is not to say that all tax elections are unjustified or 
harmful; on the contrary, where tax elections serve an 
important policy objective or create needed clarity they can 
be beneficial.  However, in the case of tax-favored treatment 
for corporate mergers, an election mechanism does not serve 
any important policy other than to provide simplicity, and, to 
be blunt, an opportunity for corporate taxpayers to decide 
whether to pay current tax or not. 
3. Explanation of Shareholder-Level 
Requirements 
The shareholder non-recognition rules of the Proposal are 
intended to deliver tax-favored treatment to stock-for-stock 
exchanges that could be characterized as “purely paper 
transactions.” 
a. Exempting Purely Paper Transactions 
Under the Proposal, the aggregate amount of Acquiror 
stock delivered to Target shareholders, either as a group or 
individually, is completely irrelevant.  As long as a Target 
shareholder receives stock in an Acquiror that has 
participated in a qualifying merger with the Target, the 
Target shareholder does not recognize gain or loss on that 
stock-for-stock exchange unless one of the exceptions in the 
Proposal is triggered.190  In determining whether to confer 
this special non-recognition treatment, the Proposal does not 
take into account the relative proportions of stock and cash 
 
in the controlled foreign corporation’s trade or business and thus, not 
Subpart F income). 
189 See Alvin C. Warren and Alan J. Auerbach, Transferability of Tax 
Incentives and the Fiction of Safe Harbor Leasing, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1752 
(1982). 
190 The treatment, of course, is subject to classification of the Acquiror 
stock as “non-qualified preferred stock” under I.R.C. § 351(g) (2005).  
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that the Target shareholders receive.  Instead, the Proposal 
asks whether an individual Target shareholder’s role within 
the enterprise has changed significantly following a merger. 
The Proposal’s treatment of a Target shareholder’s 
exchange of voting stock for non-voting stock (or vice versa) 
as taxable is vital to the objective of reserving shareholder 
non-recognition for purely paper transactions.  The 
shareholder’s right to vote generally means that the 
shareholder may, at the very least, participate in the election 
of the directors of a corporation.191  Those directors, in turn, 
are empowered to make fundamental decisions affecting the 
strategic direction of the enterprise.192  Although non-voting 
stock may allow its holder to participate in the economic 
growth of the corporation through dividend distributions, it 
does not entitle the holder to have any say over corporate 
decisionmaking (except as otherwise required by law).193  
Because voting stock carries with it the ability to have a 
voice in the governance of a corporation, it generally trades 
at a premium to non-voting stock.194  Current law ignores the 
 
191 See Rev. Rul. 69-126; 1969-1 C.B. 218 (preferred stock that entitles 
holders to vote for three out of eight directors is considered voting stock for 
federal income tax purposes); see also Erie Lighting Co. v. Comm’r, 93 F.2d 
883 (1st Cir. 1937) (defining voting stock for purposes of the Revenue Act 
of 1926 by negative implication). 
192 Some have argued that the powers bestowed upon a board of 
directors are so great that the board of directors is the key force 
influencing the strategic direction of a corporation.  Professor Stephen M. 
Bainbridge has articulated a theory of “director primacy” which comments 
that “to the limited extent to which the corporation is properly understood 
as a real entity, it is the board of directors that personifies the corporate 
entity.”  Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of 
Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547 (2003). 
193 See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case Against Board Veto in 
Corporate Takeovers, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 973 (2002) (describing the 
importance of shareholder voting and proposing that shareholders be 
required to approve takeover transactions). 
194 See Paul J. Much & Timothy J. Fagan, The Value of Voting Rights, 
in FINANCIAL VALUATION: BUSINESSES AND BUSINESS INTERESTS (1996) 
(finding 1.15 percent to 2.83 percent premium for voting stock over non-
voting stock); Ronald C. Lease, John J. McConnell & Wayne H. Mikkelson, 
The Market Value of Control in Publicly Traded Corporations, 11 J. FIN. 
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importance of a Target shareholder’s loss or gain of voting 
rights as a result of a merger that qualifies as a 
reorganization.195  This aspect of the tax law contributes 
directly to the continuity of interest fiction described in Part 
IV. 
The Proposal seeks to cure this fiction by treating such a 
dissimilar exchange as something more than a purely paper 
transaction.  If a Target shareholder gives up stock that 
entitled him to vote in exchange for stock that carries no 
such voting right (or vice versa), that Target shareholder 
should not be treated for tax purposes as though no 
substantive change has occurred.196  This aspect of the 
Proposal considers not only the question of whether a Target 
shareholder has exchanged stock for stock, but more 
specifically, whether that shareholder has received stock 
that bears significantly different rights than that which he 
relinquished. 
Similarly, the disproportionate ownership reduction test 
under the Proposal underscores the need to consider changes 
in a Target shareholder’s relative position as a shareholder 
following a merger.  Under the Proposal, a greater-than-
eighty-percent decrease (by vote or value) in a shareholder’s 
 
ECON. 439 (1983) (finding 5.44 percent premium for voting stock over non-
voting stock). 
195 Neither I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(A) (2005) (forward mergers of Target into 
Acquiror) nor I.R.C. § 368(a)(2)(D) (2005) (forward mergers of Target into 
Acquiror’s subsidiary) require the stock that Target shareholders receive 
pursuant to the reorganization to consist of Acquiror voting stock.  
Consequently, a Target shareholder may exchange Target voting stock for 
Acquiror non-voting stock, and vice versa, in a merger that satisfies either 
of these provisions. 
196 The rules regarding changes to the terms of debt instruments look 
to whether the debt instrument has undergone a “significant 
modification,” in which case the holder is treated as exchanging the old 
instrument for a new one in a taxable exchange.  Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-
3(c)(1) (1996).  Here, a Target shareholder actually exchanges old stock for 
new stock and the new stock bears significantly different rights and 
privileges in comparison to the old stock.  The same principles that apply 
in the deemed debt exchange context should apply in an actual stock 
exchange context as well. 
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percentage interest following a merger leads to current 
taxation of the shareholder’s stock-for-stock exchange.  (The 
Proposal refers to percentage interest in terms of both “vote” 
and “value” because it considers such a significant downward 
change in a shareholder’s voting power or share of the value 
of the enterprise to merit relaxation of the default 
shareholder non-recognition rule.197) 
This rule effectively addresses mergers of corporations 
with few shareholders into corporations with many 
shareholders.198  Such mergers would most likely trigger 
dramatic downward shifts in a Target shareholder’s 
proportionate ownership interest (by vote or value).199  
Returning to an example from Part IV, Farmer Brown’s 
exchange of Small Cheesecorp stock for Big Cheesecorp 
stock—where his percentage interest plummeted from 100 
percent to .001 percent—should not be deemed a purely 
paper transaction.  Farmer Brown’s voice in corporate affairs 
and his proportionate rights to the assets of the enterprise 
are completely different as a result of the merger.  If a 
general goal of the tax system is to identify realization 
events (where taxpayers exchange property for “materially 
different property”),200 then this type of exchange ought to be 
considered an event that merits current taxation. 
 
197 For an excellent discussion of the difference between voting and 
non-voting stock for purposes of I.R.C. §§ 368(c), 1504 (2005), see Stuart 
Lazar, The Definition of Voting Stock and the Computation of Voting 
Power Under Sections 368(c) and 1504(a): Recent Developments and Tax 
Lore, 17 VA. TAX REV. 103 (1997). 
198 The Proposal is significantly simpler than alternatives offered in 
the past that would have required an Acquiror to be similar in size to the 
Target, based on a number of factors, in order for special tax treatment to 
apply.  See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 83-1337, § 359(a)(1) (1954) (which would 
have caused a merger to be wholly taxable in any transaction where the 
Acquiror was significantly greater in size than the Target). 
199 Note that the Proposal is not restricted to mergers where the 
Acquiror is a public corporation, as others have suggested.  Rather, it 
would apply whenever there is such a disproportionate reduction in 
percentage interest, irrespective of the public or private nature of the 
Acquiror. 
200 See Schenk, supra note 58. 
BLANK_FINAL.DOC 2/28/2006  10:39:53 PM 
62 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2006 
The tax law already uses the disproportionate-reduction-
in-percentage-interest concept in other areas of the Code.  
For example, when a corporation redeems a portion of a 
shareholder’s stock, the Code requires a determination of 
whether the shareholder should be treated as having sold his 
stock to the corporation (resulting in capital gain treatment) 
or as having merely received a distribution from the 
corporation (resulting in dividend treatment).201  To answer 
this question, the Code looks to whether the shareholder has 
experienced a “substantially disproportionate redemption of 
stock,” such that the shareholder’s proportionate interest in 
the corporation’s non-voting and voting stock undergoes a 
dramatic reduction as a result of the redemption.202  In that 
type of redemption, the shareholder is deemed to have 
engaged in a sale rather than received a dividend 
distribution.203  The Proposal borrows this concept and uses 
it to determine whether a shareholder’s block of stock 
following a merger is significantly different than before the 
merger. 
b. Contrasts with the A.L.I. Report 
In contrast to the Proposal, the A.L.I. Report does not 
require that a Target shareholder exchange stock of the 
same voting character (i.e., voting or non-voting) in order to 
receive non-recognition treatment.  Instead, it would allow a 
Target shareholder to exchange voting common stock in a 
Target for redeemable non-voting preferred stock in an 
Acquiror without being subject to tax.204  The A.L.I. Report 
 
201 I.R.C. § 302(b)(2) (2005). 
202 Id.  In other contexts, the Code also considers changes to particular 
shareholders’ proportionate interests as a result of a variety of corporate 
actions, and it taxes these increases.  See I.R.C. § 305(c) (2005) (asserting 
that if a shareholder’s proportionate interest in the earnings and profits or 
assets of a corporation is increased as a result of a particular transaction, 
a stock distribution is deemed to have occurred). 
203 I.R.C. § 302(a) (2005). 
204 See A.L.I., supra note 20, at 163.  This result highlights a fiction 
that the Target shareholder has engaged in a purely paper transaction in 
the same way that the continuity of interest doctrine treats the exchange 
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rejects out of hand any requirement that an Acquiror deliver 
voting stock to Target shareholders, contending that “the 
requirement for voting stock constitutes an arbitrary, formal 
requirement, an occasional stumbling block . . . rather than 
an effective aid to any sensible policy objective.”205 
The A.L.I. Report’s implicit characterization of non-voting 
stock and voting stock as equivalent types of property 
ignores key differences that may affect certain shareholders 
as a result of a merger.206  If a large shareholder of a Target 
(who would also be a large shareholder of an Acquiror 
following a merger) exchanges all of his voting stock for non-
voting stock, this shareholder’s influence over the business 
enterprise is dramatically different following the merger.207  
Whereas the shareholder may have possessed the ability to 
“hand pick” the Target’s directors and to authorize a variety 
of corporate actions prior to the merger, the shareholder will 
play no such role following the merger.208  The A.L.I. Report 
ignores this distinction by opting to apply its shareholder 
non-recognition treatment to all exchanges of stock pursuant 
to a merger. 
The A.L.I. Report also falls short by rejecting a significant 
downward shift in a Target shareholder’s proportionate 
ownership interest following a merger as a factor that should 
determine shareholder-level tax consequences.  Although the 
A.L.I. Report does consider the issue, it ultimately argues 
 
of meaningful equity for significantly less meaningful equity as a 
continuation of a shareholder’s proprietary interest.  See also discussion in 
Part IV supra; Rev. Rul. 78-142, 1978-1 C.B. 111 (stating that mandatorily 
redeemable preferred stock provides sufficient continuity of interest); 
Schweitzer & Conrad, Inc. v. Comm’r, 41 B.T.A. 533 (1940). 
205 See A.L.I., supra note 20, at 163. 
206 In fairness, the A.L.I. Report addresses all forms of reorganizations 
under current law, not just statutory mergers.  As a consequence of this 
broader scope, the A.L.I. Report focuses significant attention on the 
disparate solely-for-voting stock requirement that is applicable to certain 
reorganizations, but not others.  Id. at 170. 
207 See Bebchuk, supra note 193. 
208 Without voting stock, a shareholder generally will not be entitled to 
vote for directors, but may nonetheless, be entitled to approve certain 
extraordinary transactions as a matter of state law.  See id. 
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against taking such changes into account.209  The A.L.I. 
Report comments that “it is doubtful whether large, publicly 
traded corporations often go to the trouble of arranging tax 
free reorganizations for the acquisition of very small or 
regional enterprises.”210  Perhaps this statement was 
accurate in 1980 when the A.L.I. Report was issued.  
However, in the wake of the dot-com era and with the 
increased use of corporate stock as acquisition currency that 
has occurred since the late 1990s, this argument may no 
longer be persuasive.211 
Last, the A.L.I. Report severs the link between corporate- 
and shareholder-level tax treatment in a merger.  It allows 
an Acquiror to make an express election to treat a merger as 
taxable or tax-deferred at the corporate level, but then 
creates a default non-recognition rule at the shareholder 
level regardless of the election made by the Acquiror.212  
Consequently, under the A.L.I. Report, there is no connection 
between a Target shareholder’s tax treatment and the 
election (or, for that matter, any other changes that a Target 
has undergone in the merger) at the corporate level.  This 
approach serves no apparent policy objectives other than 
administrative convenience and simplicity. 
The Proposal, however, links the tax treatment at the 
corporate- and shareholder-levels.  It expressly conditions a 
Target shareholder’s enjoyment of non-recognition treatment 
on a qualifying merger having occurred at the corporate 
level.  These requirements include continuing to conduct the 
Target’s historic business for at least two years following the 
 
209 See A.L.I., supra note 20, at 162. 
210 See id. 
211 See Bank, supra note 57 (“One of the distinguishing features of the 
1990s merger movement is that, in contrast to the junk-bond financed 
takeovers of the 1980s, its primary currency is stock. . . . While stock only 
comprised seven percent of the acquirer’s consideration in 1988, it 
comprised sixty-seven percent in 1998.”). 
212 See A.L.I., supra note 20, at 167. 
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merger.213  That an Acquiror must continue the Target’s 
historic business for such a substantial period of time after a 
merger means that the former Target shareholder ultimately 
holds stock in a corporation that could be described 
accurately as a modified form of the Target. 
If the Acquiror fails to satisfy the historic business 
requirement of the Proposal at any time during the two-year 
period following the merger, all former Target shareholders 
lose the benefit of any non-recognition treatment.214  This 
effect also serves the objective of delivering tax-favored 
treatment to mere changes in corporate form because, faced 
with the possibility of retroactive shareholder-level taxation 
(and resulting litigation), Acquirors will likely take extra 
precautions to guarantee that they do not violate the historic 
business requirement of the Proposal. 
C. Illustrative Examples 
The following examples illustrate the terms of the 
Proposal and its underlying policy justifications: 
 
Example 1 (Base Case): Farmer Brown owns 100 
percent of the voting common stock of Small Cheesecorp, 
which operates a local dairy business.  Farmer Brown enters 
into a merger agreement with Delaware Dairy, Inc. 
(“Delaware Dairy”), another local dairy business.  Small 
Cheesecorp will merge into Delaware Dairy in a transaction 
constituting a merger under Delaware law, and Farmer 
Brown will receive $70,000 cash and $30,000 worth of 
Delaware Dairy voting common stock in exchange for all of 
his voting common stock in Small Cheesecorp, Inc.  In the 
merger agreement, Delaware Dairy represents that it will 
continue to operate the business of Small Cheesecorp as a 
separate business or will use substantially all of the assets of 
 
213 As a result of this condition, a Target shareholder’s tax treatment 
on the receipt of Acquiror stock in a merger is linked to the Acquiror’s 
satisfaction of the corporate-level requirements of the Proposal. 
214 The qualifying merger condition for shareholder non-recognition 
would not be satisfied in this case. 
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Small Cheesecorp in the dairy business of Delaware Dairy 
for the entire two-year period following the closing of the 
merger.  Immediately after the merger is consummated, 
Farmer Brown’s percentage ownership interest in Delaware 
Dairy is 45 percent, measured in terms of vote and value. 
Under the Proposal, the merger in this example would 
result in tax-deferred treatment at both the corporate and 
shareholder levels. 
First, no tax would be imposed at the corporate level on 
the transfer of assets by Small Cheesecorp to Delaware 
Dairy because the merger would be a qualifying merger.  
Assuming that Delaware Dairy’s representation is accurate, 
Delaware Dairy would continue the historic business of 
Small Cheesecorp or would use its assets in a “like kind” 
business of Delaware Dairy (its dairy business) for the entire 
two-year period following the merger.215 
Second, at the shareholder level, Farmer Brown would 
not recognize gain or loss on the receipt of the Delaware 
Dairy stock, but would recognize gain with respect to the 
cash he receives to the extent of his realized gain on the 
exchange.  Under the Proposal, it is irrelevant that only 30 
percent of the aggregate consideration paid to Farmer Brown 
is Delaware Dairy stock.216  Farmer Brown also exchanges 
voting stock for voting stock and does not experience a 




215 This example highlights that, under the Proposal, taxpayers often 
will be forced to rely on representations from an Acquiror regarding its 
future plans for the Target’s historic business.  A merger agreement may 
provide that former Target shareholders could seek an indemnity from the 
Acquiror in the event that a qualifying merger is recharacterized as a 
taxable merger due to the Acquiror’s breach of such representations. 
216 The Proposal contains no requirements regarding composition of 
merger consideration paid to Target shareholders. 
217 Farmer Brown’s percentage interest drops from 100 percent in the 
Target to 45 percent in the Acquiror.  In order to implicate the 
substantially disproportionate reduction rule of the Proposal, Farmer 
Brown would need to own less than 20 percent of the Target (by vote or 
value) following the merger. 
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Example 2 (Failed Historic Business Requirement): 
Assume the same facts as Example 1, except that within one 
year of the closing of the merger, Delaware Dairy sells all of 
the Small Cheesecorp assets acquired in the merger to a 
third party for cash. 
This variation causes the transaction to be taxable at 
both the corporate and shareholder levels under the 
Proposal.  At the corporate level, a taxable sale would be 
deemed to have occurred because the transaction would fail 
to satisfy the requirements of a qualifying merger.218  The 
two-year requirement that Delaware Dairy continue the 
historic business of Small Cheesecorp would be violated as a 
result of the third-party sale.219  At the shareholder level, 
Farmer Brown would be taxed on both the stock and cash he 
receives because the stock would not be stock of an Acquiror 
that is a party to a qualifying merger.  This variation 
illustrates that under the Proposal, corporate-level actions 
that cause a merger to be something more than a mere 
change in form directly affect shareholder-level tax 
treatment. 
 
Example 3 (Voting Stock for Non-Voting Stock): 
Assume the same facts as Example 1, except that Delaware 
Dairy pays Farmer Brown non-voting stock, instead of voting 
stock. 
This merger would result in tax-deferred treatment at the 
corporate level, but taxable treatment at the shareholder 
level.  Delaware Dairy would still receive tax-deferred 
treatment because it would satisfy the requirements of a 
qualifying merger.  Unlike the continuity of interest 
doctrine, the Proposal disregards the type of consideration 
that Delaware Dairy pays to Farmer Brown in determining 
 
218 This consequence is identical to the corporate-level tax 
consequences of a failed I.R.C. § 368(1)(A) (2005) reorganization under 
current law. 
219 A sale to a third party of the Target’s historic business assets 
constitutes a per se cessation of the Target’s historic business by the 
Acquiror. 
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whether a mere change in form at the corporate level has 
occurred. 
Farmer Brown, however, would be taxed under the 
Proposal on his receipt of the non-voting stock for two 
reasons.  First, he exchanges his voting stock in Small 
Cheesecorp for non-voting stock in Delaware Dairy.  Second, 
because Farmer Brown receives cash and solely non-voting 
stock in Delaware Dairy, his percentage interest in terms of 
voting rights decreases from 100 percent in Small 
Cheesecorp to 0 percent in Delaware Dairy.220  Under the 
Proposal, both of these effects warrant treating Farmer 
Brown as having experienced something more than a purely 
paper transaction. 
 
Example 4 (Disproportionate Reduction in 
Percentage Interest): Assume the same facts as Example 
1, except that instead of merging into Delaware Dairy, Small 
Cheesecorp merges into Big Cheesecorp, a national, publicly 
traded dairy corporation with millions of shareholders.  After 
the merger, Farmer Brown’s percentage interest (by vote and 
value) shrinks from a 100 percent interest in Small 
Cheesecorp to a .001 percent interest in Big Cheesecorp. 
This transaction would receive tax-deferred treatment at 
the corporate level, but taxable treatment at the shareholder 
level.  The merger would meet the qualifying merger 
requirements.  However, Farmer Brown experiences a 
greater-than-eighty-percent reduction in his percentage 
interest as a result of the merger.221  This variation 
illustrates that under the Proposal, a greater-than-eighty-
percent reduction indicates that Farmer Brown has so 
drastically altered his percentage interest as a result of the 
 
220 Farmer Brown owned 100 percent of Small Cheesecorp prior to the 
merger measured by vote as a result of his ownership of all of Small 
Cheesecorp’s outstanding voting stock.  After the merger, when Farmer 
Brown holds solely non-voting stock of Big Cheesecorp, Farmer Brown 
owns 0 percent of Small Cheesecorp measured by vote. 
221 In other words, Farmer Brown’s percentage interest in the 
Acquiror (.001 percent) is less than 20 percent of his interest in the Target 
(100 percent) immediately prior to the merger. 
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merger that he should not be treated as having experienced 
a purely paper transaction. 
D. Potential Criticism of the Proposal 
While it is an improvement over the continuity of interest 
doctrine, the Proposal will not be immune to criticism.  Some 
may argue that the Proposal would unduly favor corporate 
taxpayers to the government’s detriment, increase the 
complexity of the tax provisions governing mergers, and 
subject business agreements to unreasonable uncertainty.  
The discussion below addresses each of these claims in turn. 
1. A Corporate Windfall in Disguise? 
A likely criticism of the Proposal is that it would result in 
a significant increase in favorable tax treatment for 
corporate taxpayers in comparison to current law.  The 
Proposal would create a regime in which all statutory 
mergers of a Target into an Acquiror or its subsidiary would 
be free from current corporate-level tax as long as the 
requirements of a qualifying merger were satisfied.  Critics 
may argue that this default tax-deferred treatment would be 
available to corporate taxpayers under the Proposal, even if 
a substantial amount of the merger consideration paid to 
Target shareholders is cash or other non-stock property.222  
Under current law, an Acquiror is at least saddled with an 
obligation to issue a certain amount of its equity to Target 
shareholders.223  The Proposal would eliminate that 
requirement entirely and, in doing so, critics may contend 
that it would make it easy for an Acquiror to enjoy tax-
deferred treatment.  Critics may argue that this increased 
 
222 This criticism reflects an inherent bias towards current law, where 
we have been indoctrinated to believe that a tax-deferred corporate 
transaction can only occur where at least some corporate stock is issued in 
the transaction.  See I.R.C. § 368 (2005). 
223 In a forward statutory merger, an Acquiror must be willing to pay 
merger consideration consisting of at least 40 percent Acquiror stock in 
order to achieve reorganization status under current law.  See Treas. Reg. 
1.368-1(e)(2)(v), ex. 1 (as amended in 2005). 
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tax deferral could mean a significant loss of tax revenue for 
the government. 
This criticism can be addressed by highlighting some of 
the differences between current law and the Proposal.  It is 
true that the Proposal would eliminate any requirement that 
an Acquiror pay a minimum amount of Acquiror stock to 
Target shareholders.  However, the Proposal contains an 
equally onerous set of conditions for tax-deferred treatment.  
A merger would not be treated as a qualifying merger under 
the Proposal unless an Acquiror continued the historic 
business of the Target in a specified manner for the two-year 
period following the merger. In many ways, the Proposal is 
tougher than current law because current law mandates only 
that an Acquiror pay certain consideration at the time of a 
merger and, after that point, the Acquiror enjoys relative 
flexibility in its operations.224  By contrast, the Proposal 
governs future actions of the Acquiror in order to ensure that 
a merger receiving tax-favored treatment is, as much as 
possible, a mere change in form.   
The corporate windfall criticism also ignores the double-
sided nature of the Proposal.  Because the Proposal would 
create a default regime of tax-deferred treatment for 
qualifying mergers, taxpayers in certain instances would lose 
the ability to recognize taxable losses.  For example, if a 
Target shareholder holds Target stock with a basis in excess 
of its fair market value, the shareholder would not be 
entitled to recognize a current taxable loss in a qualifying 
merger.  Also, at the corporate level, if a merger satisfies the 
qualifying merger requirements, the Acquiror would hold the 
Target’s assets with a carryover basis from the Target rather 
than a fair market value basis.  The consequence of 
carryover basis treatment is that, in the future, the Acquiror 
would have a diminished opportunity to claim depreciation 
 
224 As discussed above, the continuity of business enterprise rules 
under current law are relatively easy to satisfy and do not contain any 
temporal restrictions.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(d) (as amended in 2005); 
BLOCK, supra note 43, at 347. 
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deductions with respect to the Target’s assets.225  This 
diminution of potential tax benefits demonstrates that the 
Proposal has the potential to cut both ways.  The Proposal 
would either defer current taxable gain or deny current 
taxable losses.226  In either case, the treatment is justified by 
the policy that special types of mergers (qualifying mergers 
under the Proposal) should be treated as mere changes in 
form and not realization events. 
The claim that the Proposal would result in large losses of 
revenue is likely exaggerated.  Under current law, if parties 
to a merger cannot satisfy the continuity of interest doctrine, 
there are still a variety of other techniques available that 
achieve essentially the same beneficial tax effects as a 
reorganization.  For example, if these parties desire 
corporate- or shareholder-level tax deferral upon a corporate 
combination, they can achieve this treatment by 
restructuring a statutory merger as a tax-deferred 
incorporation of assets.227  Because current law allows parties 
to achieve tax-deferral with somewhat relative ease, the 
 
225 Corporate taxpayers are generally entitled to claim depreciation 
deductions for a particular asset as its utility declines over time.  See 
I.R.C. §§ 167, 168 (2005). 
226 The Proposal does not allow inconsistent treatment at the 
corporate- and shareholder-levels.  Under the A.L.I. Report, a merger can 
result in taxable loss recognition at the corporate-level (as a result of an 
election) and tax-deferred treatment at the shareholder-level.  Query 
whether it is possible to justify this potential double benefit to the owners 
of a corporate enterprise on any policy grounds? 
227 It is possible to structure a merger as a tax-deferred incorporation 
of assets under I.R.C. § 351 (2005) and to achieve substantially similar tax 
results as in a reorganization.  The key difference is that § 351 does not 
contain any limits on the amount of cash that Target shareholders may 
receive in such a transaction.  See  Rev. Rul. 84-71, 1984-1 C.B. 106 
(stating that minority shareholders receive tax-deferred treatment on 
receipt of holding company stock under § 351 without regard to whether or 
not there is continuity of interest).  This transaction is also commonly 
referred to as a “horizontal double dummy” merger or a “top hat” merger.  
For a few examples of this transaction structure, see Richard W. Bailine, 
Long Live the Horizontal Double Dummy, 29 CORP. TAX’N 30 (2002). 
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Proposal should not result in additional tax revenue loss.228  
Similar levels of tax deferral should occur under the Proposal 
as under current law, even if parties utilize the qualifying 
merger as their transaction structure of choice.229 
2. Increased Complexity 
Another likely criticism of the Proposal is that it would 
increase the complexity of the tax rules governing mergers.  
The Proposal would require taxpayers to perform both a 
corporate- and shareholder-level analysis not required by 
current law in order to determine if a merger is eligible for 
tax-favored treatment.  Parties to a merger would likely seek 
representations from an Acquiror that would address the 
amount of time, and the manner in which, the Acquiror 
intends to operate the Target’s business.  Further, if the 
Acquiror desires to use the Target’s business assets in its 
own business, the parties would need to compare the 
business of the Target with the business of the Acquiror and 
to reach a conclusion regarding their “like kind” nature.  
Target shareholders would also face increased complexity to 
some extent, because they would be required to calculate 
whether downward shifts in their percentage interests were 
significant enough to trigger gain under the Proposal.  These 
added layers of complexity may make the Proposal less 
desirable than current law or the A.L.I. Report’s proposed 
alternative. 
It is true that the Proposal requires analysis that current 
law and other alternatives do not.  The Proposal is more 
complex than current law and other proposals because its 
primary function is to identify unique characteristics of a 
 
228  For a discussion of the many ways available under current law to 
avoid gain recognition when the continuity of interest doctrine cannot be 
satisfied, see Robert Willens, Techniques Abound for Avoiding Difficult 
Continuity of Interest Determinations, 84 J. TAX’N 342 (1996). 
229 If the Proposal were enacted, parties would likely shift from such 
other techniques as the horizontal double dummy merger (which can pose 
regulatory and other non-tax constraints) to the qualifying merger as a 
means for combining businesses in a tax-efficient manner. 
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merger that is a mere change in form or a purely paper 
transaction.230  A new set of rules and factors is needed in 
order to serve this purpose.  By comparison, the proposal 
offered by the A.L.I. Report, with its corporate election 
mechanism and default shareholder non-recognition rule, 
takes a relatively simple approach.231 
Although the Proposal creates detailed new requirements, 
the transition to its set of rules should not be overly 
cumbersome.  First, the Proposal would only replace the tax 
provisions governing statutory mergers of a Target into an 
Acquiror or its subsidiary.  Effectively, these are the only 
transactions that are subject to the judicial continuity of 
interest doctrine under current law.232  The Proposal is not 
intended to replace all provisions of the Code governing the 
tax treatment of stock acquisitions, asset transfers or other 
combinations.  Implementing the Proposal by statute, 
therefore, would not be as burdensome as other alternatives, 
such as the A.L.I. Report’s proposal.233 
Second, the complexity argument is undercut by the 
Proposal’s use of concepts—such as “like kind” nature and 
disproportionate ownership reductions—that already exist 
elsewhere in the Code.234  The government and taxpayers, 
therefore, would at least have familiarity with these concepts 
 
230 For the many reasons discussed herein, the continuity of interest 
doctrine does not serve such an objective successfully. 
231 Indeed, the A.L.I. Report comments that its proposal creates “a 
radical simplification both in practice and in the definition and conception 
of more particular issues to be dealt with.”  A.L.I., supra note 20, at 7. 
232 The judicially created continuity of interest requirement is only 
applicable to transactions governed by I.R.C. §§ 368(a)(1)(A) (2005) 
(statutory mergers of Target into Acquiror) and 368(a)(2)(D) (statutory 
mergers of Target into Acquiror’s subsidiary). 
233 Repeal or fundamental modification of the continuity of interest 
doctrine should occur by statute rather than by administrative regulation.  
If the Treasury attempts to make such significant changes to the tax 
treatment of corporate reorganizations, it is possible that a court or 
taxpayers could question whether it has the authority to do so. 
234 See I.R.C. §§ 1031 (like kind exchange), 302(b)(2) (2005) 
(substantially disproportionate redemption of stock). 
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as utilized in the Proposal and would be able to employ this 
knowledge in answering questions that might arise. 
Last, an Acquiror could be required to deliver sufficient 
information to Target shareholders regarding their 
ownership interests in order to enable them to determine 
whether their stock-for-stock exchanges would result in 
taxable disproportionate reductions in percentage interest.235 
3. Interference with Business Deals 
Critics may charge that the Proposal is undesirable 
because uncertainty associated with it may chill taxpayers 
from entering into business combinations.  If a Target’s 
shareholders desire to merge their Target with the Acquiror 
in a tax-deferred manner, they may be wary that the 
Acquiror could fail the two-year historic business 
requirement (contrary to the Acquiror’s representations at 
the time of the merger).  Due to the uncertain tax outcomes 
that the Proposal effects, critics may contend that the 
Proposal would inhibit parties from entering into mergers 
where certain tax consequences are desired or may interfere 
with the parties’ business negotiations.236 
This criticism is best addressed by an explicit 
acknowledgement that the Proposal does create a degree of 
uncertainty.  This uncertainty, however, is not entirely 
detrimental.  The requirements of the Proposal are designed 
to enable tax-favored treatment to be enjoyed only in 
transactions where a mere change in corporate form occurs.  
The uncertainty that the Proposal may provoke would likely 
motivate taxpayers to take extra precautions to guarantee 
that the merger continues to be a qualifying merger from the 
 
235 Under current law, corporations engaging in reorganizations 
already distribute documentation to participating shareholders that is 
required to be incorporated in shareholders’ tax returns.  See Treas. Reg. § 
1.368-2(b) (as amended in 2005). 
236 There appears to be a consensus that “uncertainty” is one of the 
continuity of interest doctrine’s greatest problems.  See, e.g., Hutton, supra 
note 10; Miller, supra note 15; Posin, supra note 11; Wolfman, supra note 
4. 
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time of the closing throughout the following two-year period.  
After the merger, an Acquiror might even retain legal 
counsel or accountants to ensure that the Acquiror continues 
the Target’s business in the proper way and that the 
intended tax treatment of the merger would be respected by 
the IRS.237 
The Proposal thus evokes the classic struggle between a 
rules-based and a standards-based approach to tax 
compliance.238  In a rules-based system, the government and 
the taxpayers are guided by definite rules that dictate the 
outcome of a particular transaction or position.  If the 
Proposal were to follow the direction of the A.L.I. Report by 
adopting an expressly elective mechanism for determining 
the tax treatment of a merger, it would utilize a rules-based 
approach.  By making an election, the taxpayer would know 
in advance exactly how the transaction would be treated for 
tax purposes. 
In a standards-based system, the rules are not as clear-
cut, but instead describe a set of guidelines or factors that 
determine the outcome.  The Proposal adopts a standards-
based approach because it details the steps that an Acquiror 
must take to continue a Target’s historic business, but it 
does not provide the taxpayer with certainty that its steps 
will be respected.  For example, if an Acquiror could not 
satisfy the historic business requirement of the Proposal by 
conducting a Target’s historic business directly, it could use 
substantially all of its assets in a “like kind” business.  
However, the Proposal does not contain a definitive, bright 
line rule for what types of businesses are “like kind.” 
 
237 See Herlihy, supra note 73. 
238 For a thorough discussion of rules-based versus standards-based 
approaches to tax compliance, see David A. Weisbach, Ten Truths About 
Tax Shelters, 55 TAX L. REV. 215 (2002).  For a more general discussion of 
the role of uncertainty in law, see Tom Baker et al., The Virtues of 
Uncertainty in Law: An Experimental Approach, 89 IOWA L. REV. 443 
(2004).  See also Kyle Logue, The Problem of Tax Law Uncertainty and the 
Role of Tax Insurance, 25 VA. TAX REV. 339, 349 (2005) (discussing the role 
of uncertainty in a taxpayer’s analysis of whether to avoid or to evade tax 
law). 
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Consequently, this uncertainty could lead the taxpayer to 
take extra precautions.  Such actions would only strengthen 
the argument that a merger qualifying for special tax 
treatment under the Proposal represents a mere change in 
form.  
Another positive aspect of the uncertainty effect of the 
Proposal is that the government would retain flexibility to 
recharacterize transactions that are abusive.239  The lack of 
bright lines and clearly defined terms would empower the 
government to address mergers on a transaction-by-
transaction basis.  The A.L.I. Report’s purely elective 
mechanism, however, generally prevents the government 
from rescinding tax-favored treatment claimed by corporate 
taxpayers where it is unwarranted.240 
The uncertainty obstacle that the Proposal presents is 
thus justifiable.  The tax-favored treatment of a qualifying 
merger (or reorganization under current law) is an 
extraordinary exception from the general realization rule.  If 
uncertainty results in stricter compliance with a set of rules 
that distinguish an ordinary sale from a special merger, it 
should be viewed as an integral element of the Proposal. 
 
239 The IRS often seeks to recharacterize treatment of a transaction on 
the basis of “substance-over-form” principles by arguing that a court 
should look to the substance of the transaction and disregard the 
taxpayer’s chosen form.  See Peter C. Canellos, Tax Practitioner’s 
Perspective on Substance, Form and Business Purpose in Structuring 
Business Transactions in Tax Shelters, 54 SMU L. Rev. 47 (2001); Lewis R. 
Steinberg, Form, Substance and Directionality in Subchapter C, 52 TAX 
LAW. 457 (1999) (commenting that the fundamental question of corporate 
tax practice is “when will the transactional form selected by the parties 
control the tax consequences to them?”). 
240 An express taxpayer election may inhibit the government’s ability 
to apply a substance-over-form analysis in recharacterizing transactions.  
For example, under current law, when an Acquiror purchases the stock of 
a Target and makes a “Section 338(h)(10) Election” (which enables the 
Acquiror to achieve a step-up in basis in the Target’s assets), the IRS 
generally will not apply step transaction principles to integrate a 
subsequent merger or liquidation of Target with the stock purchase.  See 
Treas. Reg. § 1.338(h)(10)-1T (as amended in 2003). 
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E. Interaction with Other Reorganization Provisions 
The Proposal is intended to replace the types of 
reorganizations over which the continuity of interest doctrine 
currently governs—statutory mergers of a Target into an 
Acquiror or its subsidiary.  The Proposal is necessarily 
limited in this regard because its aim is to serve as an 
alternative for the flawed doctrine that determines the tax 
treatment of these types of combinations. 
However, there are a number of other types of 
transactions that currently may be classified as 
reorganizations under different provisions of the Code.241  
These types of reorganizations, such as stock-for-stock242 or 
assets-for-stock243 exchanges, are subject to their own sets of 
statutory requirements that explicitly state the type and 
composition of consideration that an Acquiror must pay to a 
Target to qualify for reorganization treatment.244  Those 
types of transactions are not subject to the judicially created 
continuity of interest doctrine that is the focus of this Article. 
An interesting question for the future is whether the 
Proposal could or should be applied to all transactions that 
may qualify as reorganizations under the Code, rather than 
just those that are subject to the continuity of interest 
 
241 See I.R.C. §§ 368(a)(1)(B), (C), (D), (E), (F), (G), (a)(2)(E) (2005). 
242 An exchange of the Acquiror’s voting stock for Target stock (also 
referred to as a “Type B” reorganization) will qualify as a reorganization if 
the Target stock is exchanged solely for the Acquiror voting stock and after 
the exchange the Acquiror (or a corporate subsidiary of the Acquiror) owns 
at least 80 percent of the Target’s voting stock and 80 percent of each class 
of the Target’s non-voting stock.  I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(B) (2005). 
243 The acquisition of “substantially all” of the properties of the Target 
in exchange “solely for voting stock” of Acquiror (also referred to as a 
“Type C” reorganization) followed by the liquidation of the Target will 
qualify as a reorganization.  In determining whether the exchange is 
“solely for voting stock,” the statute provides that the assumption by the 
Acquiror of the Target’s liabilities is disregarded.  An exception to the 
“solely for voting stock” requirement is that the Acquiror may transfer 
boot to the Target if at least 80 percent of the fair market value of Target’s 
properties are acquired solely for voting stock.  I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(C) (2005). 
244 See I.R.C. §§ 368(a)(1)(B), (C) (2005). 
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doctrine.  Has Congress created specific consideration 
requirements for these other types of reorganizations for a 
reason?  If one is inclined to view the tax treatment of all 
corporate combinations (regardless of transaction structure) 
as raising the same basic policy concerns, then perhaps the 
Proposal could be viewed as a prototype that could be 
expanded beyond forward statutory mergers.245  
Alternatively, if one finds unique policies justifying disparate 
tax treatment for different types of corporate combinations 
(or otherwise desires partial renovation of the reorganization 
provisions of the Code rather than wholesale demolition), the 
Proposal could be enacted as presented in this Article and 
limited to transactions subject to the continuity of interest 
doctrine. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This Article has offered a new justification for repeal of 
the continuity of interest doctrine.  The typical criticisms 
that commentators have offered in the past—that the 
doctrine is unclear, inefficient, and unfair—are largely 
irrelevant and unpersuasive.  Rather, this Article has 
examined the role of the doctrine in determining whether a 
particular merger merits special tax treatment.  This Article 
has argued that the continuity of interest doctrine is an 
ineffective means of distinguishing between mergers that 
represent mere changes in form and those that are the 
equivalent of ordinary sales.  It has demonstrated that the 
end that the continuity of interest doctrine serves—an 
aggregate group of Target shareholders continuing their 
 
245 If the Proposal is expanded to cover stock or asset acquisitions (as 
opposed to solely mergers), the Proposal would presumably need to include 
additional rules governing the amount of a Target’s assets or stock that an 
Acquiror or its shareholders must obtain in order for a mere change in 
form to be deemed to have occurred.  In a forward merger, that inquiry is 
relatively simple because substantially all of the assets held by a Target 
(at least immediately prior to the merger) are transferred to the Acquiror. 
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proprietary interests as shareholders of the Acquiror—is 
fiction.246 
Further, this Article has offered an alternative to the 
continuity of interest doctrine that differs significantly from 
current law and from proposals that have been offered in the 
past.  By conditioning tax-deferred treatment on the 
Acquiror’s continuation of the Target’s historic business for 
two years following a merger, the Proposal creates a set of 
rules that more effectively identifies a merger that is akin to 
a mere change in form.  Likewise, the shareholder non-
recognition requirements of the Proposal distinguish purely 
paper transactions from ordinary stock-for-stock exchanges. 
Like many traditions, the continuity of interest doctrine 
has been passed down from generation to generation without 
being subjected to serious reconsideration.  Unless this 
reconsideration occurs in the near future, the Treasury and 
IRS will likely continue to issue administrative relief that 
exacerbates the fiction of continuity of interest in an attempt 
to make the requirement more practical.  A doctrine 
supported by such a foundation is as shaky as that famous 
fiddler.247  Rather than await its demise, it is time to end this 
tradition. 
 
246 Stated differently, this Article has proclaimed that the continuity 
of interest emperor is not wearing any clothes. 
247 See BOCK, supra note 1. 
